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Abstract 
 
The present dissertation utilised transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
to investigate and compare mirror neuron activity in individuals with an autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically developing (TD) individuals using three 
distinct experimental paradigms. Specifically, it aimed to assess whether the 
mirror neuron system (MNS) was functionally disturbed in individuals with an 
ASD during tasks requiring emotional and social processing.  
 Given the well-entrenched conceptual connection between mimicry and 
social cognition in psychological thought, study one examined automatic mimicry 
of emotional facial expressions. It was found that TD individuals automatically 
mimicked emotional facial expressions, as demonstrated by significantly larger 
motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in emotion conditions compared to neutral 
conditions. As increased MEP amplitude during action observation is believed to 
reflect increased premotor mirror neuron activity, this result suggests that during 
facial emotion processing, mirror neurons in the premotor cortex provide an 
internal simulation of the observed motoric behaviour that evokes a similar 
reaction in the corresponding muscles of the observer. In contrast, study one 
found that participants with an ASD exhibited significantly lower MEP 
amplitudes when viewing emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli, 
suggesting that when presented with stimuli that are emotional in nature, the MNS 
actively inhibited an automatic mimicry response.  
To further explore the role of the MNS in social cognition, study two 
examined yawning contagion, as it is believed that contagiousness of yawning 
depends on mechanisms that develop during childhood in parallel with the 
empathic capacity to understand mental states of others. Study two’s finding that 
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TD participants displayed the capacity for yawning contagion, as demonstrated by 
significantly larger MEPs when viewing yawns compared to control mouth 
movements, supports this view. Further strengthening this contention was the 
finding that participants with an ASD demonstrated disturbances in the capacity 
to yawn contagiously, as evidenced by similar MEP amplitude when viewing both 
yawns and control mouth movements. 
As it is believed that a disturbance at the basic level of self-awareness 
could contribute to the higher order deficits in social cognition observed in ASD, 
study three utilised an adapted mirror-induced visual illusion of hand movements’ 
to investigate differences in self-other processing. In comparison to TD 
individuals, study three showed that individuals with an ASD displayed a deficit 
in self-awareness, reflected in ASD participants’ weaker cortical activation, 
indicative of reduced MNS activation, during a perceptual illusion of kinaesthetic 
experience, and in their difficulty discerning their experience in subjective 
measures. 
The present thesis provides support that social cognition may, at least in 
part, be sub-served by the MNS and that disturbances in this system likely 
contribute to the social communicative disturbances observed in ASD. Although 
much research is required to elucidate the link between social cognition, the MNS 
and ASD, the present dissertation raises several questions regarding the possible 
downstream consequences that may result from imitative deficits and abnormal 
self-other representations early in development, which appear to be linked to 
disturbances in the MNS. As such, the present thesis contributes new knowledge 
on processes that shape social cognition in both the typical and atypical social 
mind as well as highlighting possible neural substrates that mediate this process. 
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Chapter 1: Autism Spectrum Disorders 
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The term autism spectrum disorder refers to a group of 
neurodevelopmental syndromes characterised by impairments in socialisation, 
disturbances in verbal and non-verbal communication, and restrictive and 
repetitive patterns of behaviour (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). 
Understanding contemporary conceptualisations of disorders as complex as those 
on the autism spectrum, requires a degree of insight into the condition’s historical 
descriptions. Although autism spectrum disorders (ASD) undoubtedly existed 
prior to the original description of autism published in 1943 by Kanner, his initial 
report of the disorder demonstrates the first identification of autism as a distinct 
developmental disorder (Benaron, 2009).  
 
A Brief History of Autism Spectrum Disorders 
In 1943 Kanner published a paper containing detailed descriptions of 
eleven children, eight boys and three girls, exhibiting similar patterns of 
behaviour. These cases enabled Kanner to synthesise a number of core symptoms 
of the disorder that he later termed ‘early infantile autism’. Whilst Kanner 
recognised that the children differed with respect to the severity of their 
symptoms, their developmental course and their specific interests and behaviours, 
he was adamant that the defining characteristic of autism was impairment in 
social functioning. These children demonstrated severe limitations in their 
awareness of the social environment and a lack of interest in social interactions. 
All eleven of the children described by Kanner preferred interacting with objects 
rather than people and would become quite upset or annoyed when others 
attempted to become involved. As a result the children were typically described as 
aloof or distant. Although Kanner stressed impairments in social relations as the 
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core feature of autism, he also noted several other distinctive features. These 
included; abnormal language development and use; repetitious play - often 
involving objects that would not interest a typical child; an insistence on 
sameness; unusually intense reactions to certain stimuli; distinctive motor 
mannerisms and rapid shifts in mood.  
 Kanner established the foundation for understanding autism as a disorder 
principally defined by an inability to interact and relate to people in the typical 
fashion and, that this was generally accompanied by communication peculiarities 
and a preference for restricted and repetitive behaviours (Kanner, 1943). 
Considering the fact that Kanner based all of his conclusions on the observations 
of only eleven children over 60 years ago, it is remarkable that his core 
description still remains.  
 At the same time as Kanner’s initial description of autism, Asperger 
described another part of what we now call the autism spectrum. In 1944 
Asperger published a paper describing four boys exhibiting peculiar social 
behaviours. As the paper was not brought to the attention of English-speaking 
countries until the 1980s, Asperger’s contribution was long-overlooked. It was 
not until 1981 when Wing published a paper based on Asperger’s translated 
observations and her own clinical experience that Asperger’s work was 
recognised by the non-German speaking world (Wing, 1981). Wing’s paper 
described 34 children and adults with autism whose symptomology more closely 
resembled the descriptions of Asperger than Kanner. As the cases did not easily 
match the diagnostic criteria for autism that was being used at the time, Wing 
used the term Asperger’s syndrome (AS) in an attempt to provide a new 
diagnostic category within the autism spectrum.  
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 Whilst Wing (1981) noted that both those with autism and those with AS 
shared several fundamental features, such as; unusual eye-contact, restricted facial 
expressions, vocal oddities and impairments in non-verbal communication, she 
proposed three key characteristics that differentiate between the two conditions 
(Wing, 1981). Firstly, the autistic child is likely to be distant or indifferent 
towards others; whereas the child with AS is more likely to be peculiar or one-
sided during social approaches. Secondly, the autistic child is likely to have 
delayed or abnormal speech, whereas individuals with AS have relatively intact 
speech but have difficulties understanding complex meanings and often use 
speech that is inappropriate for the social context. Lastly, Wing proposed that the 
child with autism tends to develop stereotyped, repetitive routines involving 
objects or people, while the child with AS becomes fixated on specific topics of 
interest.  
 Although Wing successfully brought AS to the attention of researchers in 
the autism domain, it was over ten years before AS was formally recognised as a 
separate diagnostic entity in the main diagnostic systems (Benaron, 2009). This 
led to the conceptualisation of autism existing not as a discrete entity, but rather 
as a spectrum along which there are multiple disorders of varying severity 
emerging in the late 1990s, and was reflected in the diagnostic systems, the most 
widely utilised being the International Classification of Disease, Tenth Edition 
(ICD-10) and The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth 
Edition (DSM-IV-TR). Thus, autism was conceptualised as one of a spectrum of 
conditions, all of which were characterised by a triad of impairments in social 
interaction, disturbances in language and communication and narrow, repetitive 
patterns of behaviour.  
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In the DSM-IV-TR, autism and AS are subsumed under the heading 
pervasive developmental disorders (PDD). The PDD category houses an 
additional three conditions, those being Rett’s disorder, childhood disintegrative 
disorder and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-
NOS). A diagnosis of PDD-NOS is given if there is uncertainly that the individual 
truly fits within the PDD category or if there is something atypical about the 
clinical course (APA, 2000). Although these five disorders are grouped together 
under the PDD category in the DSM-IV, researchers and clinicians generally use 
the term ASDs when referring to autism, AS and PDD-NOS. This is because 
children with Rett’s disorder and childhood disintegrative disorder vary from 
ASDs with respect to their clinical course, pathophysiology and the diagnostic 
strategies implemented (Levy, Mandell & Schultz, 2009). This is important to 
note as often researchers have used the terms ASDs and PDDs interchangeably 
without explicitly stating the disorders they are referring to, thus creating a certain 
degree of ambiguity around these terms.  
The diagnostic differentiation of ASDs is subject to ongoing debate and is 
currently in a transitional phase with the advent of the DSM V in 2013 (APA, 
2013). The DSM-IV-TR attempted to differentiate ASDs on the basis of 
developmental history, age of onset and cognitive functioning in an effort to 
improve differential diagnosis and specificity (APA, 2000). However, attempting 
to draw lines where no clear lines exist does not benefit the system or the 
individual and makes categorical diagnoses imprecise (Benaron, 2009). This has 
been especially true for the distinction between individuals with high functioning 
autism (HFA) and AS. HFA is the term used to describe autistic individuals with 
normal intelligence (IQ ≥ 70) that had early language delays but went on to 
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develop functional language skills. The issue of whether HFA and AS are distinct 
conditions has been a source of continuing debate (Howlin, 2003). Additionally, 
there has also been considerable disagreement regarding the validity of the 
diagnostic criteria used in the DSM-IV and ICD-10 to distinguish between the 
two conditions (Manjiviona & Prior, 1999). Several studies suggest that if the 
hierarchical guidelines proposed by the DSM/ICD, stating that a diagnosis of 
autism takes precedence over a diagnosis of AS, are applied then a diagnosis of 
AS becomes unlikely, or even impossible (Mayes, Calhoun & Crites, 2000). As a 
result the label ‘Asperger syndrome’ has been used loosely with little agreement 
as often clinicians may identify that the DSM/ICD criteria for autism are satisfied 
but use a different diagnostic label, such as AS, to convey their overall clinical 
impressions (Williams et al., 2008).  
Although several studies comparing groups of individuals with HFA and 
AS have failed to demonstrate reliable differences between the two groups (e.g. 
Dissanayake, 2004; Howlin, 2003; Manjiviona & Prior, 1999), inadequate group 
matching, small samples, and, above all, lack of agreement on diagnostic criteria 
have meant that few of these studies have produced any conclusive results. 
Regardless of this, the differential diagnosis can have implications for services, 
with individuals diagnosed as having AS often being deprived of the level of 
support that is offered to those diagnosed as having autism (Klin & Volkmar, 
2000). This has facilitated the removal of the subcategories of autism, AS and 
HFA in favour of ASD as one all-encompassing diagnosis in the DSM-V. 
However, this has attracted controversy as many individuals who have been 
diagnosed with a particular subtype rely on their diagnosis for particular medical 
or social services (Wing, Gould & Gillberg, 2011). Thus, debate still continues 
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whether the sub categories can be differentiated diagnostically. Despite the 
challenges encountered by both clinicians and researchers regarding 
classification, it is generally agreed upon, that the diagnosis of an ASD identifies 
children with similar patterns of problems with social interaction, communication 
and behaviour.  
 
Clinical Characteristics 
 ASDs are extremely heterogeneous in their presentation as there is 
marked variability in the severity of symptomology across individuals and, their 
level of intellectual functioning can range from profound mental retardation 
through to the superior range on standard IQ tests (Filipek et al., 1999). However, 
all children on the autism spectrum demonstrate impairments that fall into core 
domains that are reliably measured and generally consistent over time, even 
though specific behaviours may change with development. Thus, accurate 
diagnosis requires looking for specific qualitative symptoms and signs within the 
core domains that characterise ASDs.  
In line with the original description of autism by Kanner, difficulties in 
social domains, especially difficulties developing meaningful attachments and 
interpersonal reciprocity, are generally still considered the core feature of ASDs 
(APA, 2013). The behaviours under this rubric range from a total lack of 
awareness of another person, to eye contact that is present but not used to 
moderate social interactions. Hence, impairment can manifest in a variety of 
behavioural symptoms, creating large variation in the clinical presentation. 
Typically, an individual with an ASD will display atypical patterns of eye-
contact, facial expressions, body posture and gestures to regulate social 
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interactions (APA, 2000). For instance, when compared to normal children, 
children with an ASD will generally exhibit reduced or abnormal eye contact or 
fail to vary facial expressions to initiate social contact (Willemsen-Swinkels, 
Buitelaar, Weijen & van Engeland, 1998). Children with an ASD appear to have 
difficulties engaging in joint attention behaviours with others, coordinating social 
cues and orienting to social stimuli, such as consistently responding to the calling 
of one’s name (Leekam & Ramsden, 2006). A child with an ASD will likely 
engage in less imitation behaviours, such as mimicking facial expressions, and 
experience difficulties perceiving and understanding others emotional states 
(Wetherby, Prizant & Hutchinson, 1998). As children with ASD lack fundamental 
social skills and often behave in a socially inappropriate manner, they have 
difficulties developing close, meaningful relationships with peers (Downs & 
Smith, 2004).  
Another area of difficulty is in the acquisition and appropriate use of 
language for communication. Communicative language function across the autism 
spectrum spans from completely mute to verbal fluency, although fluency is 
generally accompanied by various comprehension and communicative errors 
(Filipek et al., 1999). In early infancy some children with an ASD will not babble 
or use communicative vocalisations and will also fail to use compensatory 
gestures or facial expressions (Johnson, 2008). Those children with an ASD who 
do acquire some speech will almost always have comprehension deficits, 
especially in understanding higher order complex phrases. They tend to make 
literal interpretations and have difficulty grasping information that requires an 
understanding of complex concepts (Attwood, 2007). They are also likely to 
display deficits in pragmatics, the use of language to communicate effectively. 
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Some children with an ASD speak relatively fluently but are unable to initiate or 
sustain a conversation on a topic of mutual interest as their speech tends to be 
repetitious and self-directed (Filipek et al., 1999). Their language use tends to be 
stereotyped, repetitive or idiosyncratic. This may include immediate and delayed 
repetition of another person’s speech, termed echolalia, referring to one’s self in 
the third person or the usage of fabricated words called neologisms (Volden & 
Lord, 1991). Their speech may also consist of concrete and poorly constructed 
grammar, be used functionally rather than communicatively and lack imaginative 
qualities (Stone & Caro-Martinez, 1990). Additionally, children with an ASD 
generally exhibit peculiar prosodic expression such as an exaggerated or 
monotonous tone, atypical pitch and rhythm or even an adopted accent (McCann 
& Peppe, 2003). Whilst both social and communicative difficulties are still 
viewed as core features of ASDs, it is important to note that the DSM V has 
recently collapsed the two previously discrete diagnostic features into a single 
category. This has attracted controversy as some authors argue that social and 
communicative deficits are distinct genetically (Happè, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006). 
  Another defining feature of ASDs is the engagement in restricted, 
repetitive, and stereotypic patterns of behaviour, interests and activities. Like the 
previous domains, children with an ASD can display various atypical behaviours 
in a variety of areas including peculiar mannerisms, odd attachments to objects, 
obsessions, compulsions, self-injurious behaviours and stereotypies (Volkmar, 
Chawarske & Klin, 2005). Stereotypies are repetitive, non-functional, atypical 
behaviours such as hand clapping or flapping, peculiar finger movements and 
rocking and twirling that children with an ASD tend to engage in when feeling 
excited or upset (Volkmar et al., 2005). It has been observed that in children with 
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HFA the stereotypic movements may diminish as they get older, developing into 
more socially acceptable minimised behaviours, such a finger tapping (Filipek et 
al., 1999). In non-autistic intellectually disabled individuals the display of 
stereotyped, repetitive movements is inversely related to IQ (Matson et al., 1997). 
This has resulted in the widespread assumption that individuals with an ASD who 
have IQs in the intellectually disabled range engage in higher rates of repetitive 
behaviour than individuals with high functioning ASDs, however there is no 
reliable evidence supporting this conjecture (Turner, 1999). Children with an 
ASD will often engage in highly repetitive play that rarely involves traditional 
toys and lacks the spontaneity and symbolism evident in the play of typically 
developing children (Filipek et al., 1999). Additionally, they often form unusual 
attachments and restricted interests with regards to objects of play or particular 
topics and facts (APA, 2000). For example, a child with ASD may insist on 
carrying around a toy cow but rather than play with the toy in an imaginative 
manner they will be obsessed with the manufacturing of dairy products. Many 
children on the autism spectrum become preoccupied with ‘sameness’ (Richler, 
Bishop, Kleinke & Lord, 2007). They develop an inflexible adherence to non-
functional routines and rituals that if disturbed, even marginally, cause extreme 
emotional distress (Richler et al., 2007). Individuals on the autism spectrum may 
also develop hypo- and hypersensitivities to certain stimuli, such as noise for 
example. Although this is more prominent in children with ASDs than typically 
developing children, there is no evidence that sensory symptoms differentiate 
children with ASDs from children with other developmental disabilities (Rogers 
& Ozonoff, 2005).  
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 As the historical conceptualisations of autism have evolved so have the 
criteria utilised for diagnosis. The qualitative behavioural impairments listed 
above currently form the basis for diagnosing a child with ASD and are the result 
of decades of past research. While the significant changes in the operational 
definitions and criteria used to diagnose ASDs have led to improved diagnostic 
precision, they have made epidemiological estimation of ASDs particularly 
challenging.    
 
Epidemiology, Clinical Course and Comorbidity 
Since the first systematic studies estimating the prevalence of autism 
carried out in the 1960s, to recent prevalence estimations, there has been a 
perceived increase in the prevalence of autism. The median prevalence rate of 
autism for 18 studies published between 1966 and 1993 was 4.7 cases per 10 000, 
while that for the 18 studies published between 1994 and 2000 was 12.7 cases per 
10 000 (Fombonne, 2005). This increase has led to the hypothesis that the 
prevalence of autism is on the rise. However, several factors complicate the 
interpretation of the perceived increase, including changes in diagnostic practice, 
the view of autism as being on a spectrum rather than a discrete entity, increased 
awareness of ASDs, earlier diagnosis and issues of study design and case 
ascertainment. Furthermore, a common source of confusion has been the lack of 
differentiation between prevalence, the proportion of individuals in a population 
who suffer from a defined disorder, and incidence, the number of new cases 
occurring in a population over a period of time. At present, the recent upward 
trend in rates of prevalence cannot be directly attributed to an increase in the 
incidence of the disorder (Fombonne, 2005). Although most of the existing 
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epidemiological data are inadequate to properly test hypotheses on changes in the 
incidence of ASDs, meta-analytic reviews of epidemiological studies suggest that 
unique design features could account, almost entirely, for between-studies 
variations in prevalence rates and time trend changes (Fombonne, 2005; Wing & 
Potter, 2002). Further, these reviews suggest that changes in diagnostic practice 
and the increased awareness and recognition of ASDs are responsible for the 
higher prevalence figures (Fombonne, 2005; Wing & Potter, 2002). Presently 
available data suggest that a prevalence rate of 1 in 68 is a reasonable estimate for 
ASDs (Centre for Disease Control [CDC], 2014).  
Studies based on both clinical and epidemiological evidence find a 
considerable difference in the prevalence of ASD with respect to gender, with 
boys being affected more than girls in a ratio averaging around 3.5:1 to 4.3:1 
(Fombonne, 2005). Gender differences are more pronounced when an ASD is not 
associated with intellectual disability, with a male to female ratio of 5.5:1. 
Conversely, when only cases with moderate to severe mental retardation are 
considered, the sex ratio decreases to approximately 1.95:1 (Fombonne, 2005; 
Scott, Baron-Cohen, Bolton & Brayne, 2002). The cause of the observed gender 
differences in relation to intellectual functioning remains a debated topic.   
 Although the average age of diagnosis for children with an ASD is usually 
between three and four years of age, there is wide variability in the age of 
diagnosis from one case to the next (Mandell, Novak & Zubritsky, 2005). For 
instance, retrospective studies suggest that in some children deficits can be 
detected in the first year of life (Werner, Dawson, Osterling & Dinno, 2000), 
while those with less severe symptoms may not be diagnosed until they reach 
school age, or in the case of higher functioning individuals with an ASD as late as 
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nine years of age (Howlin & Asgharian, 1999). Given that the literature is 
showing that signs of ASDs are present in the first year of life, the mean ages of 
diagnosis are still rather high. One of the main reasons for the delayed diagnosis 
of ASDs despite their early behavioural manifestations is that fact that the current 
diagnostic systems focus on behaviours that generally occur later in development 
(Barbaro & Dissanayake, 2009).  
 Long term follow up studies predict that the majority of individuals with 
an ASD will demonstrate a poor prognosis (Nordin & Gillberg, 1998). It appears 
IQ level at the time of diagnosis and language, particularly the presence of 
communicative speech before five years of age, are the best predictors of long-
term outcome in ASDs (Billstedt, Gillberg & Gillberg, 2007). Although there is 
wide variability in outcome, most individuals with IQs in the intellectually 
disabled range and an absence of communicative speech by the age of five years 
will have severe deficits in social functioning and be unable to live independently 
(Nordin & Gillberg, 1998). In those with higher IQs it is more difficult to make a 
reliable prediction regarding outcome however individuals with HFA/AS are 
certainly more likely to be able to work and live independently (Nordin & 
Gillberg, 1998). The presence of co-morbid conditions can also have implications 
on an individual’s prognosis with co-morbidity generally being the rule in ASDs 
rather than the exception. A large number of medical conditions, psychiatric 
disorders, and behavioural and motor dyscontrol symptoms are associated with 
ASDs (Gillberg & Billstedt, 2000). Some of the more common co-morbid 
conditions include epilepsy, hearing and visual impairments, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), Tourette syndrome and depression (Gillberg & 
Billstedt, 2000).  
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Concluding Remarks  
The history of conceptualising ASDs is almost as complex as the disorders 
themselves. In light of this, it is surprising that Kanner‘s (1943) original 
descriptions have stood the test of time so well. Although debate still continues 
regarding the classification, diagnosis and the true prevalence of ASDs there is 
currently universal agreement that the ASDs are a heterogeneous group of 
neurodevelopmental disorders characterised by a recognisable pattern of 
behaviours and an onset in early childhood. Given the wide variability in 
language ability, intellect, social skills and the numerous co-morbid conditions, it 
is not surprising that attempts to identify unified aetiological theories have been 
unsuccessful. Contemporary research supports the notion that ASDs may be 
caused by several factors, including genetic vulnerability and environmental 
influences (Inglese & Elder, 2009). However, the exact causes of the abnormal 
brain function that leads to the behaviours exhibited in ASDs remains an 
extremely contentious issue. The following chapter aims to review the 
contemporary aetiological theories of autism.  
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Chapter 2: The Aetiology of Autism Spectrum Disorders 
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Given the heterogeneous nature of autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), it is 
not surprising that the question of causation continues to perplex experts in the 
field. There is currently an emerging consensus that ASDs are a group of 
neurodevelopment disorders that are likely to result from a number of causal 
factors rather than result from a single cause (Bailey et al., 1995; Happe, Ronald, 
& Plomin, 2006; Ritvo, Freeman, Mason, Mo & Ritvo, 1985). However this is 
where the consensus ends and the controversy begins, as the exact cause of the 
abnormal brain functions that lead to the behaviours that define ASD remain 
unknown. As the aetiology of autism has been examined by a variety of 
disciplines, there is a substantial number of theories proposed and literature 
available. The present chapter aims to provide a brief review of various 
contemporary theories and research that have added to the understanding of 
ASDs.  
 
Genetic Predisposition 
For over 20 years, genetic investigations have played a major role in ASD 
research. As a result, it is now well established that ASDs are highly heritable 
(Grice & Buxbaum, 2006; Ritvo et al., 1985; Ronald et al., 2006). The relative 
risk of recurrence among siblings when one is diagnosed with an ASD is 20 to 80 
times greater than the population base rate (O’Roak & State, 2008). Dependent on 
the definition and criteria employed, twin studies suggest that 58-92% of 
monozygotic twins are concordant for ASDs, compared with approximately 10%-
20% for dizygotic twins (Hallmayer et al., 2011; Muhle, Trentacoste & Rapin, 
2004; Ronald & Hoekstra, 2011). While these studies suggest a strong genetic 
base for ASDs, they also highlight that there are likely to be environmental and/or 
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epigenetic factors influencing both the expression and severity of ASDs (Muhle et 
al., 2004).  
In a minority of cases, 10-15%, ASDs are associated with known genetic 
causes. The most common include fragile X syndrome, tuberous sclerosis, and 
various chromosomal abnormalities such as maternal duplications and deletions 
of identified genes (Kumar & Christian, 2009). It should be noted that none of 
these causes are specific to the disorder as a whole; rather they are specific to a 
range of phenotypes, such as intellectual disability. The male predominance also 
suggests a genetic role in the inheritance of ASDs. Several genetic processes can 
lead to male predominance, including causative genes located on the X 
chromosome (Benaron, 2009). However, the view that an uneven sex ratio is the 
result of damaged genes on the X chromosome is not universally accepted. For 
instance, Baron-Cohen proposed the theory that ASDs are the result of ‘the 
extreme male brain’ (Baron-Cohen, 2002). The theory attributes the uneven sex 
ratio to the fact that male brains are naturally programmed to focus on 
systematising, while the female brain is oriented towards empathising. The theory 
proposes that high levels of testosterone in utero result in the brain developing 
more systematising abilities and less empathising tendencies. Although this 
theory is not widely accepted, it illustrates that it is important not to assume that 
the uneven sex ratio is purely the result of damaged genes on the X chromosome 
and to recognise that there may be other factors in play.  
 In an attempt to explain the extensive heterogeneity in ASDs, 
contemporary genetic research is exploring the complex interactions between 
multiple genes. Consequently, it has recently been proposed that separate genes 
may contribute to the three core areas of impairment, thus explaining the wide 
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variations along the autism spectrum (e.g. Happè, Ronald & Plomin, 2006). 
Neuroscientists have also noted that it is essential to examine genes modulating 
different biological functions, rather than just genes expressed in the brain 
(Benaron, 2009; Grice & Buxbaum, 2006). This line of thinking has resulted in 
the discovery of a variant of the MET gene’s implication in the expression of 
ASDs. The MET gene produces a product that modulates the nervous system and 
the gut (Campbell et al., 2009). Evidence from genetic linkage studies suggests 
that disrupted MET signalling may contribute to an increased risk of developing 
an ASD (Campbell et al., 2009). The MET gene is just one of the many genes 
implicated in the development of ASDs. It is important to note that possessing a 
specific gene that increases an individual’s susceptibility is not sufficient enough 
to cause an ASD; other genetic or environmental factors must be involved before 
an ASD develops. Whilst it is generally accepted that environmental factors 
modulate already existing genetic mechanisms implicated in the phenotypic 
expression of ASDs, the identification of specific environmental factors involved 
is an extremely controversial topic.  
 
Environmental Issues 
As many of the brain abnormalities associated with ASDs occur in the 
first two trimesters of pregnancy, it is believed that environmental factors, such as 
teratogenic exposure, may be implicated in the development of ASDs (Kolevzon, 
Gross & Reichenberg, 2007). Although the literature suggests that ASDs are 
linked to various environmental exposures, for example exposure to pesticides, as 
of yet, none have been linked conclusively (Benaron, 2009). Various perinatal 
factors, such as low birth weight, duration of gestation and events during the 
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birthing period have also been investigated (Juul-Dam, Townsend & Courchesne, 
2001). However, as findings have been inconsistent no conclusions can be 
reliably drawn.  
Aetiological possibilities occurring after birth have also been investigated. 
The focus of most of the research has been on the belief that the administration of 
certain immunisations, namely the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine (MMR) 
and vaccines containing mercury, causes ASDs in some genetically predisposed 
children (Inglese & Elder, 2009). After completing a study examining 12 
children, it was contended by Wakefield et al. (1998) that the onset of regressive 
autism and intestinal abnormalities was associated with the MMR vaccination. 
This conjecture gained a lot of attention from both professionals and the media. 
Despite criticism concerning the methodological flaws of the study, a retraction of 
the article from the journal, rigorous follow-up studies and reports from the 
institute of medicine stating that there is no causal link between the MMR vaccine 
and ASDs, it still remains a controversial issue (Brown et al., 2012; Institute of 
Medicine [IOM], 2001; The editors of the Lancet, 2010). Questions have also 
been raised regarding the effects of mercury-containing vaccines on brain 
development in ASDs (Blaxill, Redwood & Bernard, 2004). It has been 
postulated that the preservative thimerosal, which contains mercury, causes 
neurotoxicity which leads to the development of an ASD (Blaxill et al., 2004). 
However, recent systematic reviews suggest that, to date, no association has been 
found between thimerosol containing vaccines and ASDs (Parker, Schartz, Todd 
& Pickering, 2004). Although most researchers are convinced that genetic 
vulnerabilities interacting with environmental factors play a significant role in the 
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development of ASDs, the details remain to be explicated. Thus, it is essential 
that research continues to evaluate possible genetic and environmental factors.  
 
Neurobiological Links to Autism  
In recent years, intense research efforts have focused on elucidating the 
neurobiological origin of ASDs. A growing body of evidence from 
neuropathology and neuroimaging studies indicate that there are fundamental 
discrepancies in brain development and organisation between individuals with an 
ASD and typically developing individuals. In Kanner’s (1943) initial description 
of autism, it was noted that the children had enlarged heads. Subsequent reports of 
autism head circumference, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and post-mortem 
brain weight have generally confirmed Kanner’s conjecture (Redcay & 
Courchesne, 2005). Studies that have failed to report significant increases in brain 
or head size have generally been criticised on the basis of insufficient statistical 
power or specific sample characteristics (e.g., Herbert et al., 2003). While a great 
deal of research and discussion has focused on confirming that brain size is 
abnormal in autism, studies are only now beginning to address age-related 
changes. Redcay and Courchesne (2005) conducted a meta-analytic review of 15 
studies of head circumference, MRI, and post-mortem brain reports in an attempt 
to examine age-related changes in brain size in ASDs from birth to adulthood. 
Redcay and Courchesne found that individuals with ASDs display reduced or 
normal brain size at birth, followed by an early rapid rate of brain growth. This is 
then believed to be followed by an abrupt cessation of growth by 2 to 4 years as 
fewer adolescents and adults with ASDs exhibit increased brain size when 
compared to controls. However, as the meta-analysis examined cross-sectional 
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studies these results should be viewed with caution. Longitudinal studies are 
needed to verify these observations.      
The identification of the neural factors underlying the perceived rapid 
brain growth in early years is essential, as it will likely improve understanding of 
the mechanisms underlying the emergence of ASDs. Thus far, it is not clear 
whether all neural structures are equally affected by the rapid brain overgrowth or 
what the functional significance of this may be. To date, studies examining the 
enlargement of individual lobes have been contradictory. For example, a study 
completed by Piven et al. (1995) found a selective enlargement of occipital, 
parietal and temporal lobes, while a similar study found the opposite, i.e. the 
frontal lobe was enlarged (Carper, Moses, Tigue, & Courchesne, 2002). However, 
given the heterogeneity of ASDs it is difficult to establish whether the conflicting 
findings are the result of methodological and participant variations or different 
neural profiles. Investigations have also attempted to determine if the increase in 
brain volume is due to an increase in grey matter, white matter, or both (e.g. 
Herbart et al., 2003; Waiter et al., 2005). Although the research is limited, the 
data suggests an age related effect. The cross-sectional research indicates that 
grey and white matter are increased in young children, white matter is increased 
in older children, and grey but not white matter is increased in adolescents and 
adults with ASDs (Lainhart, Lazar, Bigler & Alexander, 2005). These changes are 
likely to result in abnormal neuronal connectivity, thus impairing communication 
between brain areas. Given the physical constraints on how large the brain can 
grow while still preserving adequate levels of connectivity, co-occurrence of 
reduced white matter and reduced functional connectivity appears quite plausible 
(Ringo, 1991). Thus, changes in grey and white matter with age need to be further 
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investigated in ASD. The application of new methods, such as cortical pattern 
mapping, will allow a more detailed, accurate study of the anatomic 
underpinnings of increased brain volume in ASD and changes across 
development (Sowell, Thomson & Toga, 2004).  
The study of the volume and shape of selected subcortical structures has 
been of interest given what is known about the modularity of the brain and the 
conviction that specific brain-behaviour relationships can be identified in ASDs. 
Post-mortem and MRI studies, mostly of adolescents and adults with ASDs, have 
found variable evidence of structural abnormalities (Amaral, Schumann & 
Nordahl, 2008). The most frequently highlighted being the frontal lobes which are 
involved in complex reasoning; the amygdala which plays a critical role in 
emotion formation and the cerebellum which plays an important role in attention, 
language development, motor functioning and affective processing (Amaral et al., 
2008). Given the enormous heterogeneity of ASDs, the diverse occurrence of 
significant co-morbid conditions and the relatively small sample sizes of both 
MRI and post-mortem studies of ASDs, the detection of these abnormalities are 
quite noteworthy. However, attempts at defining the neuroanatomy of ASDs are 
still in their infancy and the findings are still largely inconsistent, thus any links 
between abnormalities in specific subcortical structures and autism spectrum 
pathology are still extremely tentative.   
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has permitted an 
unprecedented opportunity to examine patterns of brain activation when 
individuals are presented with a stimulus or asked to perform a particular 
cognitive task. However, because of the need for higher functioning, verbal 
subjects who can understand tasks and cooperate, and the labour intensity 
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involved in processing and analysing fMRI data, the sample sizes have generally 
been quite small. None the less, studies are suggesting that brain functioning, in 
terms of the areas of the brain involved and the degree of involvement, are 
different in individuals with ASDs than typically developing individuals with 
respect to a variety of different domains (Lainhart at al., 2005). Functional MRI 
studies utilising face processing tasks have been particularly informative with 
respect to the neural circulatory required for normal social interactions. Studies 
have demonstrated that when typical individuals gaze at faces an area in the 
frontal lobe, called the fusiform gyrus, and the amygdala are activated (Pierce, 
Muller, Ambrose, Allen & Courchesne, 2001). However, studies suggest that this 
may not be the case for individuals with ASDs (e.g. Wang, Dapretto, Hariri, 
Sigman & Bookheimer, 2004). Several studies have demonstrated that individuals 
with ASDs have abnormal or weak activation of the regions supporting face 
processing in typical individuals and utilise some brain areas not used by typical 
individuals during face processing (e.g. Kleinhans et al., 2008; Pierce et al., 
2001). These findings suggest that the normal neural network involved in facial 
processing is disrupted in individuals with ASD, resulting in an alternative, less 
effective pathway being formed.  
Functional MRI studies have also suggested that a network of visuomotor 
cells known as mirror neurons may not function optimally in individuals with 
ASDs (e.g. Dapretto et al., 2005). Mirror neurons are activated by the 
performance or observation of object or goal related actions. Thus they are 
believed to be responsible for imitation that occurs automatically. Automatic 
imitation is an area that individuals with ASD’s have been shown to possess 
deficits in (e.g. Smith & Bryson, 1994). As multiple areas of the brain, including 
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the motor and emotional control centres, must be connected through the mirror 
neuron system (MNS) to allow for the natural coordination of imitation, mirror 
neuron dysfunction would provide an explanation for many of the problem areas 
in ASDs (Benaron, 2009). Whilst research examining the MNS is still in its 
infancy, the theory of mirror neuron dysfunction in autism appears promising.  
 
Cognitive Theories of Autism  
Psychological models of ASDs play a key role in the search for factors 
involved in the aetiology and pathogenesis of ASDs. Researchers have conducted 
numerous experiments examining how individuals with an ASD approach 
intellectual tasks and perceive the social world around them. As a result, several 
theories have emerged that attempt to explain the cognitive and social patterns 
exhibited by individuals with an ASD. Currently, the most prominent theoretical 
concepts are; weak central coherence, deficits in executive function and deficits in 
theory of mind.  
Central coherence refers to an individual’s ability to integrate information 
into central concepts and meaningful wholes. As individuals with ASDs have a 
tendency to focus on details rather than integrated and meaningful wholes they 
are hypothesised to possess weak central coherence (Happe & Firth, 1996). This 
has been demonstrated through studies showing an autistic superiority on tasks 
requiring attention to detail, such as the block design subtest of the Weschler IQ 
test (Shah & Firth, 1993), and an impairment on tasks requiring integrating 
fragments of objects and sentences in a paragraph (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
2001). Although the weak central coherence hypothesis has been questioned on 
the basis of some conflicting findings and the limited range of perceptual and 
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cognitive domains studied from this perspective (Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, Schultz 
& Klin, 2004), it is supported by neurological findings. Abnormal connections 
between separate brain areas due to white matter abnormalities would likely 
impair an individual’s ability to synthesise complex information. MRI studies 
indicate that individuals with ASD display white matter abnormalities, thus 
providing biological support for the weak central coherence hypothesis (e.g. 
Herbert et al., 2003; McAlonan et al., 2005; Waiter et al., 2005). For example, a 
recent MRI study comparing 17 children with high functioning autism (HFA) and 
17 age and IQ matched controls found that white matter was reduced bilaterally in 
the cerebellum by 19% in the children with HFA (McAlonan et al., 2005).  
Executive function refers to the brain processes that filter incoming 
stimuli and direct attention towards the most important output (Hill, 2004). 
Executive function skills require higher-order thinking processes, thus they are 
concentrated in the frontal lobes (Benaron, 2009). The executive dysfunction 
theory postulates that the repetitive, restrictive behaviour exhibited by individuals 
with an ASD is the result of an inability to shift attention (Hill, 2004). To date, 
this is the only cognitive theory that attempts to explain this facet of the condition. 
However, studies demonstrating that an ASD can be present without executive 
dysfunction, pose a serious challenge to the executive dysfunction hypothesis of 
ASDs (e.g. Griffith, Pennington, Wehner & Rogers, 1999; Hill & Russell, 2002). 
For example, a study examining self-monitoring abilities, a key component of 
executive functioning, found no performance differences between 20 children 
with an ASD and 20 age matched controls (Hill & Russel, 2002). Thus, it has now 
been suggested that while some individuals with an ASD may have impairments 
in executive function, executive dysfunction is not a core feature of ASDs.  
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The theory of mind (ToM) describes the ability to understand the mental 
states, beliefs, desires and intentions of others, and to appreciate how these differ 
from our own (Baron-Cohen, 2001). The ToM hypothesis posits that the social 
dysfunction in ASDs results from disruptions in the processes that lead to the 
ability to conceive one’s own mind and the mind of others (Baron-Cohen, 2001). 
Under-connectivity between separate areas of the brain would be expected to 
disrupt the complicated neural circulatory that allows this process to take place. 
The MNS may be an example of one type of complex system that is necessary for 
effective ToM abilities. Although a theoretical link has been made between mirror 
neurons and ToM, this hypothesis is yet to be tested directly. Given the large 
research base identifying ToM deficits among those with ASD and the promising 
research surrounding mirror neurons it is essential that this link be investigated.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Although there is a wealth of literature examining the aetiology of ASDs 
the question of causation is yet to be answered. While it is generally accepted that 
environmental factors modulate already existing genetic mechanisms, the 
identification of both the specific environmental factors and genes involved in the 
development of ASDs have yet to be elucidated. A growing body of evidence 
from neuropathology and neuroimaging studies indicate that there are 
fundamental discrepancies in brain development and organisation between 
individuals with an ASD and typically developing individuals. Although a 
definable and reliable, neurophysiological marker has yet to be identified, the 
cumulative data on brain circulatory indicates that the biologic basis of the brain 
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dysfunction in ASDs may be the result of abnormal connectivity in neural 
networks. Promising research suggests that disruptions in the MNS may explain 
many of the problem areas seen in ASDs. In light of this, the following chapter 
aims to provide a detailed description of mirror neuron dysfunction in autism 
spectrum disorders. 
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Chapter 3: The Mirror Neuron System and Autism Spectrum Disorders 
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Elucidating the underlying neural basis of the social and communicative 
deficits that characterise autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has proved challenging. 
However, the recent discovery of visuomotor cells, known as mirror neurons, in 
macaque monkeys may provide a basis for explaining various behavioural 
impairments exhibited by individuals with ASD (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
While mirror neurons are primarily thought to be involved in the perception and 
comprehension of motor acts, they are also believed to play a fundamental role in 
higher order cognitive processes such as empathy, imitation, theory of mind 
(ToM) and language, all of which are known to be impaired in ASDs (Williams, 
Whiten, Suddendorf & Perrett, 2001). The present chapter aims to review 
research investigating the mirror neuron system (MNS) and its dysfunction in 
ASDs.  
 
The Mirror Neuron System 
Mirror neurons were originally discovered in the ventral premotor cortex 
(area F5) and the inferior parietal lobule of the macaque monkey (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). The defining characteristic of these neurons is that they 
discharge both when the monkey performs a goal related motor action, such as 
grasping an object, and when the monkey observes a similar motor action being 
performed by another monkey or a human (Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti & Fogassi, 
2003; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). These neurons ‘mirror’ the action performed 
by another, as though they themselves were performing the action. This allows a 
direct matching between the visual description of an action and its execution. 
Thus, this observation-execution system is likely to be involved in the 
comprehension of action (Gallese & Goldman, 1998).  
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Although mirror neurons have only been directly observed in humans 
recently (Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni and Fried, 2010), the existence of 
an analogous system in the homologous brain regions has been supported by 
indirect measures such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (e.g. Fadiga, 
Fogassi, Pavesi & Rizzolatti, 1995), electroencephalograph (EEG) (e.g. 
Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson & McNair, 2004) and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) (e.g. Buccino et al., 2001) over the past two decades. 
Brain imaging studies have demonstrated that the observation of transitive actions 
completed by others results in an increase in blood oxygen level-dependant 
signals not only in the visual areas, but also in the inferior parietal lobule, the 
ventral premotor cortex and the caudal part of the inferior frontal gyrus, which 
roughly corresponds to the pars opercularis (Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008). 
The latter three areas have motor properties and closely correspond to the areas 
containing mirror neurons in monkeys (Rizzolatti, Fabbri-Destro & Cattaneo, 
2009). Activation of these areas have been consistently reported not only during 
the execution and observation of actions but also during the imitation of actions, 
an ability that is commonly disturbed in ASDs (Iacoboni, 2005). 
Mukamel and colleagues (2010) were the first and only researchers to date 
to provide direct electrophysiological evidence of the existence of mirror neurons 
in humans. Mukamel and colleagues conducted a single cell study on humans by 
investigating patients with intractable epilepsy. They reported that the human 
MNS appears to extend beyond the regions previously identified, as neurons with 
mirror properties were also observed in the medial frontal cortex supplementary 
motor area and the medial temporal lobes, namely the hippocampus 
parahippocampal gyrus and entorhinal cortex. Whilst neurons with mirror 
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properties were also observed in the amygdala, as well additional areas in the 
medial frontal cortex, including the pre-supplementary motor area and both rostral 
and dorsal aspects of the anterior cingulate, the number of such cells did not reach 
significance levels. Thus, whilst the very existence of mirror neurons in humans is 
no longer under such scrutiny, the specific distribution of mirror neurons in the 
human brain requires additional evidence as the prevailing view of a fronto-
parietal network circuit homologous to the primate brain may be limited (Keysers 
& Gazzola, 2010). 
Researchers posit that because the same pattern of mirror neuron 
activation occurs both when performing and observing an action; primates can 
recognise the goal of a motor act performed by others (Ferrari et al., 2003; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Tkach, Reimer & Hatsopoulos, 2007). 
Additionally, in humans it is speculated that mirror neurons have evolved to 
represent not only the physical aspects of an action but also the underlying 
intentions, thoughts and feelings motivating that action, possibly through 
reciprocal connections with other brain regions such as the limbic system or 
medial prefrontal cortex (Williams et al., 2001). Further, it is believed that this 
evolutionary process has provided the basis for more complex functions such as 
imitation, empathy, ToM and language, all of which can be impaired in autism 
(Williams et al., 2001). 
 
The Functional Significance of the Mirror Neuron System 
The ability to imitate the actions of others is usually disturbed in ASDs 
(Williams, Whiten & Singh, 2004). It is likely that in order to imitate motor acts 
one must possess the capacity to transform the sensory description of the 
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observed action into an internal motor representation (Iacoboni et al., 1999). As 
mirror neurons appear to have the capacity to function as a bridge between higher 
visual processing and the motor cortex, i.e. between seeing and doing, they are 
believed to play a key role in imitative abilities. Further, it is suggested that this 
mirror system might underlie the ability to understand other people’s intentions 
by providing an automatic simulation of their actions, goals, and intentions 
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Neuroimaging studies examining typically 
developing individuals have provided evidence supporting the supposition that 
mirror neurons represent the neural basis for imitation (e.g. Iacoboni et al., 1999).  
One study used repetitive TMS (rTMS), a technique that provokes a 
transient depression of neural activity in the stimulated region, to disrupt 
functioning in specific cortical regions during imitative tasks. The study 
demonstrated that when eight participants received rTMS over the left or right 
pars opercularis their performance was significantly impaired on imitative tasks 
(Heiser, Iacoboni, Maeda, Marcus & Mazziotta, 2003). Thus, the disruption of an 
area believed to be populated by mirror neurons resulted in a decrement in 
imitative performance. It is important to note that the MNS is obviously not 
sufficient for the implementation of all forms of imitative behaviour. Existing 
data suggests that large scale interactions between the core circuit for imitation 
and other neural networks are necessary for imitative learning and social 
mirroring (Iacoboni, 2005).  
 Developmental behavioural data demonstrates that imitative behaviour is 
critical in the development of social cognitive skills, such as empathy (Meltzoff & 
Prinz, 2002). Empathy refers to the ability to recognise, understand and 
vicariously experience the emotional states of others. A perceived lack of 
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empathy is a very early sign of an ASD, and deficits in empathic behaviour have 
been shown to emerge as early as 20 months (Charman et al., 1997). It is well 
established that humans are inclined to imitate each other automatically when 
interacting socially (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Additionally, the more they tend 
to imitate others, the more likely they are to be empathic (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999). Anatomical studies investigating the perceived role of mirror neurons in 
empathy have generally utilised the paradigm of observation and imitation of 
facial expressions (e.g. Braadbaart, de Grauw, Perrett, Waiter & Williams, 2014; 
Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta & Lenzi, 2003). These findings suggest that 
the embodiment of the facial expressions and body postures of others may be one 
means of eliciting an empathic response. Given the role of mirror neurons in 
imitation and action understanding, it is logical to posit that the MNS may be 
involved in the empathic process. Additionally, as empathising also requires 
emotional processing, the limbic system is also believed to be implicated in the 
formation of an empathic response (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). Since the MNS 
and the limbic system are anatomically connected via the insula in the primate 
brain (Augustine, 1996), it is believed that in the human brain a large-scale 
network composed of the MNS, the insula and some limbic structures may 
provide the ability to empathise with others through the representation and inner 
imitation of the actions of others. Evidence from anatomical studies has provided 
support for this hypothesis. For example, one study used fMRI to examine 11 
typically developing subjects while they were asked to imitate or observe 
emotional facial expressions (Carr et al., 2003). The study found that during both 
observation and imitation the MNS, insula and amygdala were activated. 
Although evidence from anatomical studies implicate the MNS in the process of 
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forming an empathic response, the methodology of correlating a task to brain 
activity does not definitively prove the involvement of the MNS.  
 Another important skill needed for successful social interactions is the 
ability to understand the mental states, intentions, beliefs and desires of others. 
This ability is generally termed ToM and as discussed earlier, there is a large 
body of literature identifying ToM deficits in individuals with ASDs (Baron-
Cohen, 2001). It has been theorised that the MNS may underlie part of this ability 
as it is believed to have the capacity to provide the observer with an automatic 
internal simulation of the actions, goals and intentions of another (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998). Although this theory is yet to be tested directly, research 
suggests that the human MNS can selectively respond to specific intentions. For 
example, an fMRI study examining 23 typically developing subjects found that 
the mirror neuron areas responded differently to the sight of the same grasping 
action embedded in two different contexts, drinking and cleaning up (Iacoboni et 
al., 2005). This provides evidence that the MNS codes not only the action but also 
the intention associated with it. Thus, providing indirect support that the MNS 
plays a role in ToM abilities.  
 Although somewhat more tenuous, mirror neurons have also been linked 
to language development. Subtle language impairment is one of the main 
diagnostic criteria for autism and experimental and clinical studies demonstrate 
that a wide array of language impairments can occur in ASDs (APA, 2000). It has 
been theorised that the evolution of language from an earlier gestural 
communication system may be the result of the observation-execution system that 
mirror neurons provide (Arbib, 2005; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). Communicative 
mirror neurons have been discovered in area F5 of the Macaque monkey (Ferrari 
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et al., 2003). These neurons discharge during the observation and execution of 
communicative mouth actions, such as lip-smacking. As the human homologue 
region to area F5 is Broca’s area, which is believed to be the language centre of 
the brain, it has been speculated that the evolution of language from an earlier 
gestural communication system may be the result of the observation-execution 
system that mirror neurons provide (Arbib, 2005; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). This 
progression from gestural communication to vocal language is believed to be the 
result of a need to communicate complex mentalistic concepts such as thoughts, 
feelings and intentions (Williams, 2005).   
 As a result of the association between the behavioural deficits seen in 
ASDs and the theorised functions of the MNS, it has been hypothesised that the 
MNS may be impaired in individuals with an ASD. It has been proposed that a 
dysfunctional development of the MNS, possibly the result of a combination of 
environmental and genetic factors, could result in impaired imitation abilities and 
self-other representations (Perkins, Stokes, McGillivray & Bittar, 2010). 
Consequently, this could lead to impairments in social and communicative 
abilities such as ToM, empathy and language, all of which are defining features of 
ASDs (Enticott et al., 2012; Fecteau, Lepage & Théoret, 2006; Théoret & 
Fecteau, 2005; Williams et al., 2001). The following section aims to review some 
of the evidence pertaining to this theory. However, it is important to note that an 
impaired MNS is unlikely to account for all the behavioural symptoms seen in 
ASDs as features of restrictive, repetitive and inflexible behaviour appear to 
incorporate a degree of imitation from others.  
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Mirror Neuron Dysfunction in Autism Spectrum Disorders 
Likely the result of its explanatory power, the mirror neuron hypothesis of 
ASDs has been tested frequently in recent years, using various techniques and 
approaches. One well established EEG observation is that mu rhythm, an EEG 
waveform recorded from the motor cortical areas, is suppressed not only when a 
person makes a voluntary movement but also when they observe another 
individual performing a voluntary movement. As the mu rhythm is generated by 
activity in the sensorimotor areas, and mirror neurons are believed to be located in 
the premotor cortex, it has been hypothesised that the suppression of the mu 
rhythm reflects a downstream modulation of primary sensorimotor areas by 
mirror neuron activity (Pineda, 2005). Thus, it is believed that mu wave 
suppression to observed actions can be used as a selective measure of activity in 
the MNS (Oberman et al., 2005). Given this, it would be reasonable to expect that 
if mirror neurons are abnormal in individuals with an ASD then mu suppression 
will be absent or reduced when they observe another individual performing a 
motor act.   
 Oberman et al. (2005) used this methodology to compare mu wave 
suppression in 10 males with an ASD and 10 age and gender matched control 
subjects while watching a video of a moving hand, a video of a moving non-
biological stimulus, and while moving their own hand. The control subjects 
showed significant mu suppression during both the self-performed and observed 
hand movement, while the ASD group only showed significant suppression 
during the self-performed hand movement. This finding has recently been 
replicated by a similar study that utilised both male and female subjects 
(Martineau, Cochin, Magne & Barthelemy, 2008). On the contrary, one study 
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utilising a similar paradigm did not find a significant group difference during the 
observed hand movement when comparing a group of 20 high functioning ASD 
subjects and 20 aged matched controls (Raymaekers, Wiersema & Roeyers, 
2009). Although these results could be viewed as evidence against the mirror 
neuron hypothesis, comparison of ASD samples across studies is problematic as 
they are such a diverse group and symptom severity is often not reported in detail. 
Given the extreme heterogeneity seen in children with an ASD it is important that 
future research investigates to what extent factors such as social cognition, 
influence mirror neuron functioning. Ideally, this will provide some clarity 
regarding the discrepancy in research findings. Despite one differing finding, for 
the most part this research base provides support for the hypothesis that 
individuals with an ASD may possess a dysfunctional MNS. However as the tasks 
were primarily motor based, the social and emotional domain was not tested 
directly.  
 It has been hypothesised that the mirror neuron dysfunction reported in 
individuals with an ASD may be the result of a lack of social relevance in the 
stimuli employed (Oberman, Ramachandran & Pineda, 2008). In an attempt to 
explore this, a recent study investigated how familiarity between an observing 
individual and a person performing an action influences mu suppression 
(Oberman et al., 2008). In this study, 13 children with an ASD and 13 typically 
developing children observed a video of a stranger, a guardian and themselves 
performing the same grasping action. The control group showed significant mu 
suppression for all three conditions, with the lowest mu suppression when 
viewing a stranger’s hand. In contrast the ASD group showed significant mu 
suppression when viewing themselves or a familiar person performing the hand 
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action but not when it was performed by an unfamiliar person. These findings 
suggest that mirror neuron activity was only disturbed in the ASD group when the 
stimulus was believed to be socially unfamiliar. However, the results should be 
interpreted with caution as the mirror neuron activity could be influenced by 
factors other than familiarity. For example, the results could be due to a 
compensatory mechanism whereby mirror neuron activity towards a familiar 
person is altered by other brain regions as the result of an automatic learned 
response to the familiar person. It has been proposed that the pattern of results 
found provides an explanation for the clinical observation that an individual with 
an ASD displays improvements in social and communicative skills when 
interacting with a parent or sibling as opposed to a stranger (Oberman et al., 
2008). When reviewing EEG research it is important to note that it is an indirect 
indication of mirror neuron activity as it is measuring the modulation of 
sensorimotor neurons by the premotor cortex. Another method commonly 
employed to investigate mirror neuron activity in humans is by means of fMRI. 
Functional MRI studies have been particularly valuable in the assessment of 
regions of brain activation during tasks requiring emotional processing.  
 A recent fMRI study investigated the functioning of the MNS in 10 high 
functioning children with an ASD and 10 age and IQ matched typically 
developing controls in the context of a socio-emotional task (Dapretto et al., 
2006). Subjects were required to imitate and observe facial expressions displaying 
basic emotions such as anger and sadness. The results showed a markedly weaker 
activation of areas believed to be populated by mirror neurons, especially the pars 
opercularis, in the children with high functioning ASD when compared to the 
control group during both the imitation and observation task. Given that both 
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groups showed reliable activation of areas implicated in both facial processing, 
including the fusiform gyrus and the amygdala, the difference cannot be attributed 
to the high functioning ASD group failing to adequately attend to the facial 
stimuli. Furthermore, the activity measured in the mirror neuron areas in the 
children with high functioning ASD during both tasks was negatively correlated 
with symptom severity as assessed by widely used clinical scales including the 
autism diagnostic schedule (R²=0.49) and the autism diagnostic observation 
interview (R²=0.72; Dapretto et al., 2006). The results of this study support the 
hypothesis that mirror neuron dysfunction is a core deficit in ASD and suggests 
that activity in mirror neuron areas during socio-emotional tasks could be a 
neurophysiological marker for ASDs. Whilst fMRI studies have proved valuable 
in attempts to localise the human mirror system, the demonstration that the motor 
cortex dynamically replicates observed actions, as if the observer was executing 
them, can only be achieved by techniques providing fast and focal measurements 
of cortical activity (Fadiga, Craighero & Olivier, 2005). This is where TMS has 
proved to be a valuable technique in assessing MNS activation during the 
perception of actions performed by others, as it can provide a temporally accurate 
estimate of corticospinal excitability (Fadiga et al., 2005).  
TMS is a means of stimulating nerve cells in the motor cortex via the 
administration of a brief magnetic pulse to the scalp. This pulse produces a motor 
evoked potential (MEP) in the specific muscle stimulated that can be measured 
via surface electromyography (EMG). As the premotor cortex extends posteriorly 
to the primary motor cortex, mirror neurons in the ventral premotor cortex are 
believed to connect sensory neurons responding to the visual properties of an 
observed action and corticospinal neurons that discharge MEPs during the 
  42 
execution of a similar action (Fadiga et al., 2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; 
Zult, Howatson, Kádár, Farthing & Hortobágyi, 2013). Thus, when TMS is 
delivered during the observation of action within the stimulated muscle, it is 
believed that premotor mirror neuron activity increases excitability in the motor 
cortex resulting in enhanced MEP amplitude. This has been supported by several 
TMS experiments demonstrating that when typically developing individuals view 
the actions of others their motor system provides a simulation of the observed 
action in a strictly congruent and temporally aligned manner (Brighina, La Bua, 
Oliveri, Piazza, & Fierro, 2000; Fadiga et al., 1995; Gangitano, Mottaghy, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2004; Sartori, Cavallo, Bucchioni & Castiello, 2011).  
Whilst this methodology has been frequently adopted to investigate motor 
facilitation during the observation of action in typically developing individuals, it 
has not been widely utilised with ASD populations. Despite the limited research 
base, there is evidence suggesting that this modulation may be abnormal in 
individuals with an ASD (Théoret et al., 2005). For example, a study completed 
by Théoret and colleagues (2005) utilised TMS to investigate motor facilitation 
during the observation of intransitive, meaningless finger movements in 10 
individuals with an ASD and 10 age and gender matched controls. The authors 
demonstrated that observation of movement in TD individuals’ selectively 
enhanced motor activity specific to the muscles required to reproduce that 
movement, whereas this modulation was abnormal in ASD participants. 
Specifically, ASD participants displayed typical patterns of motor activation 
when performing the observed action and when viewing another completing the 
same action from the allocentric (other) perspective. However when that same 
action was viewed from the egocentric (self) perspective, ASD participant’s failed 
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to show motor facilitation in the specific muscles required to reproduce this 
action. These findings imply a mirror-related deficit in self-awareness that affects 
self-other processing in ASDs, thus providing further support for the possible role 
of the MNS in tasks requiring social and emotional processing, such as our ability 
to differentiate and compare the self and other. 
 While there is a growing body of evidence investigating the functional 
disturbances of the MNS in individuals with an ASD, few studies have 
investigated anatomical differences in the MNS. Although further research is 
required, the existing evidence supports the mirror neuron hypothesis of ASDs 
(e.g. Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder & Tager-Flusberg, 2006). For example, an MRI 
study comparing 14 high functioning adults with an ASD to 14 sex, age and IQ 
matched typically developing individuals found local decreases of grey matter in 
the ASD group in areas believed to house mirror neurons, specifically the pars 
opercularis, superior temporal sulcus and inferior parietal lobule (Hadjikhani et 
al., 2006). Thus, current evidence suggests that mirror neurons can be both 
functionally and structurally disturbed in individuals with ASDs.  
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
Although mirror neurons have only been discovered recently, they have 
already stimulated research programmes in a variety of disciplines such as social 
and cognitive neuroscience and the neurobiology of disease. The mirror neuron 
hypothesis of ASDs is beginning to provide further insights into the condition and 
inspire novel forms of intervention (Rizzolatti et al., 2009). While the research 
base is still relatively small, there is evidence suggesting that brain regions 
believed to contain mirror neurons can be functionally and structurally disturbed 
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in individuals with ASD. Although caution needs to be employed when 
interpreting findings due to the small number of studies, the research indicates 
that mirror neuron dysfunction in ASD is marked when information is of a socio-
emotional nature. Given that the few studies that directly investigate the socio-
emotional domain utilise the observation and imitation of facial expressions as 
their experimental paradigm it is important, not only that these studies are 
replicated but also that new experimental paradigms examining different socio-
emotional aspects are developed. As studies have demonstrated that the MNS 
interacts with other brain regions during tasks involving emotional processing in 
typically developing individuals it is essential that the connectivity between the 
regions believed to house mirror neurons and regions implicated in emotional 
processing are explored further in ASD samples. This could help explain the 
heterogeneity seen in autism as specific problems in connectivity between the 
mirror neuron network and multiple additional brain regions could result in a 
multitude of variable symptoms.  
When reviewing the hypothesis that individuals with an ASD possess an 
impaired MNS it is important to note that the theory does not purport to explain 
all the symptoms of the disorder, such as various aspects of restrictive and 
repetitive behaviours. Instead it is believed that mirror neuron activity plays a 
fundamental role in the higher order cognitive processes such as empathy, 
imitation, ToM and language that are disturbed in ASD. Explicating the role of 
mirror neuron dysfunction in ASDs will not only improve diagnostic clarity but it 
will also have substantial treatment implications as the brain is a plastic organ and 
it function and structure can be modified by training. Thus, it is crucial research 
continues to explore mirror neuron activity in individuals with an ASD.  
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As a result of this, the present dissertation aims to investigate and compare 
mirror neuron activity in individuals with an ASD and typically developing 
individuals using three distinct experimental paradigms. Achieving this by 
utilising TMS to assess corticospinal excitability during tasks requiring emotional 
and social processing.   
It is hypothesised that when compared to typically developing individuals, 
individuals with an ASD will display functional disturbances in the MNS, as 
evidenced by reduced or absent corticospinal activation when viewing stimuli that 
is socio-emotional in nature.  
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Chapter 4: Automatic Facial Mimicry and Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 
  
  47 
Introduction 
The ability of typically developing (TD) individuals to automatically 
mimic the behaviour of those around them is a pervasive and fundamental aspect 
of social human behaviour. Elementary mimicry, such as tongue protrusion, lip 
smacking and mouth opening, has been observed in new-born infants as early as 
42 hours after birth (Meltzoff & Moore, 1989). These rudimentary imitation 
abilities are present very early in life and increase in complexity during 
development with adults displaying a tendency to mimic others body postures and 
gestures (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), tone of voice, prosody and syntactic 
constructions (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2005), 
facial expressions (Dimberg, Thunberg & Elmehed, 2000) and even breathing 
rates (McFarland, 2001). These automatic mimicry behaviours are believed to 
facilitate social functioning and communication, including building interpersonal 
rapport, emotional contagion, empathy and the understanding of other minds 
(McIntosh, 2006).  
In development, these imitative abilities are believed to provide the child 
with information about the actions and intentions of those around them, which 
assists the process of social learning, and forms the basis for future social 
development (Rogers, Hepburn, Stackhouse & Wehner, 2003). Given this, a 
deficit in imitative abilities could not only impair a child’s ability to understand 
the emotions of others but, if such a deficit occurred early in development it could 
significantly impair the child’s ability to form self-other representations (Rodgers, 
1999). As a result, the significance of imitation for interpersonal and emotional 
processes has generated significant interest in recent years with a particular focus 
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on possible imitative deficits in disorders of social-emotional functioning such as 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD; Sevlever & Gillis, 2010).  
One of the most investigated and robust instances of mimicry is the 
spontaneous mirroring of emotional facial expressions (McIntosh, Reichmann-
Decker, Winkielman & Wilbarger, 2006). That is, the mere observation of another 
person’s emotional facial expression elicits a corresponding expression in the 
observer that occurs quickly (Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998) and automatically 
(Dimberg, Thunberg, & Grunedal, 2002). This spontaneous mirroring has been 
proposed to facilitate social skills through a process of contagion and an internal 
simulation of the observed emotion (Oberman, Winkielman & Ramachandran, 
2007). Underlining the potential significance of this process for social 
understanding, recent investigations have shown this facial mimicry effect is 
associated with greater empathy (Sonnby-Borgström, 2002), emotion recognition 
(Enticott, Johnston, Herring, Hoy & Fitzgerald, 2008) and emotional reciprocity 
(McIntosh, 2006).  
Given the developmental significance of spontaneous mirroring, including 
facial mimicry, recent interest has focused on identifying the neural substrates 
that mediate this process of imitation (Kana, Wadsworth & Travers, 2011). The 
discovery of specific cortical brain cells that respond to both the execution and 
observation of motoric behaviour has offered promising insight as to how humans 
may perceive and perform the actions of others. It is proposed that this system, 
known as the mirror neuron system (MNS), allows for the simulation of not just 
another individual’s intentions, but also their state of mind, which is then believed 
to inform subsequent interactions (Enticott et al., 2008). As a result, it has been 
speculated that mirror neurons are involved in the development of social 
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cognition processes that facilitate effective social interactions including the 
development of empathy, theory of mind (ToM) and facial emotion processing 
(Enticott et al., 2008; Fecteau, Lepage & Théoret, 2006; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange 
& Keenan, 2007). In addition to the empirical evidence supporting the link 
between the MNS and social cognition in TD individuals (e.g. Agnew, Bhakoo & 
Puri, 2007; Oberman, Pineda, & Ramachandran, 2007; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004), there is also evidence suggesting a deficit in this system may be linked to 
the social-emotional deficits observed in ASDs (e.g. Buccino & Amore, 2008; 
Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder & Tager-Flusberg, 2006). 
Many researchers believe the MNS directly influences imitative abilities 
as it facilitates the appropriate understanding of actions which, appears to be an 
important prerequisite for imitation, as one has to form a representation of the 
model and then effectively plan and execute the imitative action (Kana et al., 
2011). Specifically, it has been proposed that the spontaneous mimicry of facial 
expressions, may in part, be attributable to the MNS, whereby automatic 
processing by mirror neurons allows an internal modelling of another’s facial 
expression which facilitates an understanding of the observed individual’s mental 
and affective state and results in the spontaneous mimicking of the observed 
expression (Enticott et al., 2008; Kana et al., 2011). This contention is supported 
by several fMRI studies in TD individuals which suggest that the production and, 
in some accounts, the mere observation of facial expressions is associated with 
enhanced activation in a region of the premotor cortex, a proposed component of 
the MNS (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta & Lenzi, 2003; Dapretto et al., 
2006). Despite the theorised importance of automatic emotional mimicry to the 
social functioning of TD individuals, little research has been dedicated to 
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exploring how this process may be impacted in ASDs, particularly with respect to 
a dysfunctional MNS. Although the exact nature of this impairment remains 
unknown, the available research does suggest the presence of deficits in 
spontaneous mimicry in individuals with an ASD. 
Contemporary studies have employed automatic mimicry tasks in 
combination with neurological measures to investigate differences in automatic 
facial mimicry between TD individuals and individuals with an ASD. In these 
tests of automatic mimicry, participants are not asked to imitate modelled 
movements. Instead they are instructed to merely observe actions while the 
experimenter measures involuntary muscular responses. This protocol provides a 
measure of the extent to which observing an action is priming its execution 
through activation of the muscles involved in its execution in a passive 
observation task. For example, McIntosh et al. (2006) utilised surface 
electromyography (EMG) to measure muscular activity in specific facial muscles 
while TD individuals and individuals with an ASD viewed various emotional 
facial expressions. While TD individuals spontaneously activated facial muscles 
corresponding to the observed expression, i.e. they exhibited greater activation in 
muscles involved in smiling when they were presented with a smiling face and 
greater activation in the muscles involved in frowning when they observed an 
angry face, individuals with an ASD did not exhibit this pattern. Stel, van den 
Heuvel and Smeets (2008) observed a similar effect in adolescents and Oberman 
Winkielman & Ramachandran (2009) in children.  
In addition, fMRI studies have also found that when children and adults 
observe emotional facial expressions, participants with an ASD display reduced 
activation in the premotor mirror neuron area compared to TD participants 
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(Dapretto et al., 2006). In contrast, Press, Richardson and Bird (2010) argue that 
automatic mimicry abilities in ASD are intact. In Press et al.’s stroop paradigm 
participants were asked to perform a pre-specified surprised or angry facial 
expression in response to observed angry or surprised facial actions, measuring 
the speed of this action with motion tracking equipment. The authors found that 
both the TD and ASD group responded faster when they were instructed to make 
the same expression to the one viewed compared to making an incongruent 
emotional expression. From this finding they contended that there are no deficits 
in automatic mimicry abilities in individuals with an ASD. Further, the authors 
posit that this finding suggests there is no impairment in the MNS in ASD and 
that previous demonstrations of impairments are instead driven by a lack of visual 
attention to the stimuli or motor sequencing impairments.  
It should be emphasised that empirical evidence strongly suggests that 
individuals with an ASD are successfully able to voluntarily imitate the emotional 
facial expression of another when specifically instructed to do so (e.g. McIntosh 
et al., 2006; Oberman et al., 2009). Given this, it is plausible that Press and 
colleagues (2010) tested the voluntary imitative abilities of their participants as 
opposed to automatic mimicry as participants were instructed to perform a pre-
specified facial expression. Thus, the studies that have observed an absence of 
automatic facial mimicry in ASD likely reflect a true disturbance in these abilities 
as opposed to deficits in perception, praxis, motivation or task understanding.  
 While previous research investigating deficits in automatic facial mimicry 
in ASD has, for the most part, used neurological techniques such as EMG and 
fMRI to look at either muscular or cortical responses in isolation and then infer 
deficits in mirror neuron activity, the research examining cortico-muscular 
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activity is extremely limited. Given the proposed link between the MNS and 
automatic mimicry, assessing simultaneous brain and muscular activity would 
provide important insights (Carr et al., 2003; Kana et al., 2011). In an attempt to 
assess this, Enticott et al. (2008) utilised transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
in conjunction with EMG to investigate the association between mirror neuron 
activation and facial emotion processing in TD adults.  
TMS was used, as it is a means of stimulating nerve cells in the motor 
cortex via the administration of a brief magnetic pulse to the scalp. This pulse 
produces a motor evoked potential (MEP) in the specific muscle stimulated that 
can be measured via EMG. As the premotor cortex extends posteriorly to the 
primary motor cortex, mirror neurons in the ventral premotor cortex are believed 
to connect sensory neurons responding to the visual properties of an observed 
action and corticospinal neurons that discharge MEPs during the execution of a 
similar action (Fadiga, Craighero & Olivier, 2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; 
Zult, Howatson, Kádár, Farthing & Hortobágyi, 2013). Thus, when TMS is 
delivered during the observation of action within the stimulated muscle, it is 
believed that premotor mirror neuron activity increases excitability in the motor 
cortex resulting in enhanced MEP amplitude. Enticott et al. (2008) correlated 
participants’ performance on a task of visual discrimination, where participants 
indicated if pairs of emotional expressions were the same and, an emotion 
recognition task where participants had to identify the emotional expression, with 
MEP amplitude in a specific muscle in the hand whilst observing movement 
observation videos of hand actions. Enticott et al. found that increased MEP 
amplitude during action observation was correlated with better performance on 
the facial emotion processing tasks. From this, Enticott et al. argues that this 
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research demonstrates that a marker for mirror neuron activity in the premotor 
cortex, i.e. TMS during action observation, correlates with social cognition, thus 
providing empirical support for theoretical accounts concerning the role of the 
MNS in social functioning.  
While Enticott et al. (2008) provides valuable information regarding facial 
emotion processing and mirror neuron activity, to date this methodology has yet 
to be employed to directly assess automatic facial mimicry in TD individuals or 
individuals with an ASD. Further Enticott and colleagues stimulated and recorded 
cortico-muscular activity of the hand and used this to infer face related cortico-
muscular mirror neuron activity as opposed to measuring facial activity directly. 
Ideally the cortical region of the motor cortex corresponding to the face should be 
stimulated directly to gain a more accurate measurement of muscular response 
and mirror neuron activation specific to the face.  
Given the well-entrenched conceptual connection between mimicry and 
social cognition in psychological thought, and in an attempt to progress the above 
line of enquiry, the present study aimed to investigate automatic mimicry of 
emotional facial expressions in TD individuals and individuals with an ASD. 
Achieving this, by employing an automatic facial mimicry paradigm whilst 
utilising TMS to stimulate the cortical region of the motor cortex corresponding 
to the face and using EMG to assess spontaneous muscle activation in the 
corresponding muscles of the face. It was hypothesised that TD individuals would 
actively engage in automatic mimicry of emotional facial expressions as 
demonstrated by increased MEP amplitude in emotional conditions compared to 
neutral conditions. Further, it was also hypothesised that individuals with an ASD 
would demonstrate a lack of automatic mimicry of emotional facial expressions as 
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demonstrated by no difference in MEP amplitude between emotion and neutral 
conditions. 
 
Method 
 The methods and procedures used in this chapter form the basis for all 
methods and procedures of data collection for subsequent chapters in this thesis. 
Therefore, the methods in each experimental chapter are an abridged version of 
the current chapter, with only the most appropriate sections reproduced. All 11 
typically developing (TD) participants and 10 participants with an autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) attended a single session where they partook in each of 
the three experimental paradigms. Experimental order was counterbalanced 
between participants’ to account for any potential order effects and each 
participant was tested at the same time of day. Due to equipment malfunctions not 
all participants are included in each of three studies.  
 
Participants. 
Participants were ten typically developing male adults (TD) and ten male 
adults with a diagnosis of either high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger’s 
syndrome (AS). One TD participant was excluded due to equipment malfunction. 
Participants with HFA/AS (M=23.3) were age stratified to TD participants 
(M=24.7) within 3 years (age range 18-34). The mean age and SD of all 
participants was 24 and 3.9 respectively. TD participants were recruited by word 
of mouth and at Deakin University. Participants with HFA/AS were recruited 
from Autism Victoria’s research database, schools such as the Western Autistic 
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School, word of mouth, and advertisements and mail outs from paediatric clinics. 
An experienced Clinical Psychologist who has worked extensively in the autism 
field confirmed diagnosis using DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria. 
All participants were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Prior to the experimental procedures, participants completed the Adult 
Safety Screening Questionnaire to determine their suitability for transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS; Keel, Smith & Wassermann, 2001). The TMS safety 
screen was used to exclude participants who had any pre-existing medical 
conditions (such as epilepsy or stroke), or any implanted devices (such as cardiac 
pacemakers), which may have resulted in adverse effects from TMS (see 
Appendix A). 
The Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DUHREC 
2009-135) granted ethics approval in accordance with the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) prior to the commencement of this 
research (see Appendix B). All participants were provided with the plain language 
statement (PLS) and gave written, informed consent prior to engaging in the 
experimental procedures (see Appendix C). 
 
Stimuli. 
The stimuli presented were eight happy, eight angry and eight neutral 
static pictures of facial expressions sized 10 cm by 10 cm presented on a 13-inch 
laptop computer screen placed approximately 60 cm away from the participant. 
The eight individual faces chosen in each condition were selected from the 
NimStim stimulus set consisting of 192 photographs of different facial 
expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009). The photographs utilised in the present 
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study comprised of eight male actors matched across conditions and were selected 
from this set based on their emotional identification reliability estimates of > .8 
for happy and angry facial expressions and > .7 for neutral expressions. Each 
photograph was displayed for 20 seconds, followed by a 15 second inter-stimulus 
interval where a black screen with a white central fixation cross was presented.  
Coordinated with the timed presentation of the photographs was a pre-
recorded sound that was elicited once each photograph had been displayed for 
five seconds and then again when the photograph had been displayed for 15 
seconds. The sound indicated to the experimenter to deliver a TMS pulse and 
allowed for consistency of TMS delivery across all stimuli presentation. The 
sound was delivered to the experimenter through headphones to prevent the sound 
from being heard by the participant.  
 
Experimental Design.  
The experiment consisted of two blocks. In the Zygomaticus Major (ZM) 
block participants’ engagement in automatic mimicry towards happy facial 
expressions was examined, specifically, activation of the ZM muscle, which pulls 
up the cheek when making a smiling facial expression (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 
1986). In the Corrugator Supercilii (CS) block participants’ engagement in 
automatic mimicry towards angry facial expressions was examined, specifically, 
activation of the CS muscle, which furrows the brow when making a frowning 
facial expression (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986). The ZM and CS blocks were 
counterbalanced between participants to account for any potential order effects. 
Within both the ZM and CS blocks were three conditions: baseline, 
control and experimental. In all conditions within the ZM block, surface 
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electromyography (EMG) electrodes were placed on the ZM muscle and the 
identified optimal position on the primary motor cortex (M1) to elicit motor 
evoked potentials (MEPs) in the ZM was identified. Similarly, in all conditions 
within the CS block, surface EMG electrodes were placed on the CS muscle and 
the identified optimal position on the M1 cortex to elicit MEPs in the CS was 
identified. Before each condition participants were instructed simply to ‘watch the 
pictures as they appear on the screen’.  
In the baseline conditions participants were presented with a black screen 
with a white central fixation cross. During these conditions 16 MEPs were taken 
while the participant simply viewed the screen. The baseline conditions examined 
individual participants resting MEP amplitude in the ZM and CS muscles. Thus 
each participant completed this condition twice, once in the ZM block and once in 
the CS block. 
In the control conditions participants were presented with eight neutral 
facial expressions displayed for 20 seconds each. During these conditions 16 
MEPs were taken while the participant viewed the photographs, one after each 
photograph had been displayed for five seconds and one after each photograph 
had been displayed for 15 seconds. Each photograph was followed by a 20 second 
inter-stimulus interval where a black screen with a white central fixation cross 
was presented. Again, each participant completed this condition twice, once in the 
ZM block and once in the CS block. 
Similarly, in the experimental conditions participants were presented with 
eight happy facial expressions in the ZM block and eight angry facial expressions 
in the CS block, with 16 MEPs taken in the same manner as the control 
conditions.  
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The baseline, control and experimental conditions were counterbalanced 
within each ZM and CS block to account for any potential order effects.  
 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and Electromyography. 
TMS is a safe, non-invasive technique that depolarises corticospinal 
neurons at the level of M1. A coil is placed on the surface of the skull, which 
passes a weak electrical current through the scalp to stimulate neuron pools. Thus, 
TMS allows MEPs to be measured at the muscle when the corresponding part of 
M1 is stimulated.  
Prior to using TMS, measurements of each participant’s skull dimensions 
were taken. A tape measure was used to measure the subject’s head in reference 
to nasion-inion and inter-aural lines. A tight fitting cap was then placed on the 
subject’s head, and was dotted with sites at 1 cm intervals in a latitude-longitude 
matrix.  
Focal TMS was used to measure corticospinal excitability of specific 
facial muscles, ZM in the block of happy experimental conditions and CS in the 
angry block of experimental conditions. Specifically, TMS was applied over the 
left M1 using a BiStim unit attached to two Magstim 200² stimulators (Magstim 
Co, Dyfed, UK) to produce MEPs in the left ZM and CS muscles. A circular coil, 
with an external loop diameter of 90 mm, was held over the left M1 at the optimal 
position to elicit MEPs in the desired facial muscle for the appropriate 
experimental block. The coil was placed over the vertex of the head and held 
tangential to the skull in an antero-posterior orientation. Sites near the estimated 
centre of the ZM and CS were explored to find the optimal site at which the 
largest MEP amplitude was obtained, and this area was marked with a small “x” 
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in permanent marker. Care was taken by the researcher to ensure that the coil was 
held over the same position on the scalp so that the same area of the M1 was 
stimulated for all conditions within the relevant experimental block (Figure 4.1) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Experimental set up. Participants wore a tight fitted cap with markings 
of 1 cm distance in both antero-posterior and medio-lateral directions. A circular 
coil (90 mm) was held tangential to the skull in an antero-posterior orientation, so 
that the current flowed in a counter-clockwise direction for activating the left M1. 
 
Once each subject’s optimal spot was identified, their resting motor 
threshold (RMT) was tested. For this study, RMT was defined as the minimum 
intensity required to elicit an MEP (i.e. a peak-to-peak amplitude of 50 uV). Once 
RMT was identified, MEPs in all conditions were taken at 120% of RMT, which 
ensured a reliable signal. All MEP trials that contained any pre-stimulus EMG 
(100 ms before stimulation) were discarded from analysis. MEP amplitudes were 
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measured peak-to-peak in each individual trial. The process outlined above was 
completed independently for both the trials utilising the ZM and the CS muscles. 
Surface EMG activity was recorded from the ZM muscle (cheek) during 
the conditions within the ZM block and from the CS muscle (brow) during the 
conditions within the CS block. Bipolar Ag-AgCl electrodes were placed on the 
respective muscle belly whilst a reference electrode was placed on the bony 
prominence of the participant’s clavicle. All cables were fastened with tape to 
prevent movement artefact. The area of electrode placement was shaven to 
remove fine hair, rubbed with an abrasive skin rasp to remove dead skin, and then 
cleaned with 70% isopropyl alcohol. EMG signals were amplified (x1000) with 
band pass filtering between 20 Hz and 1 kHz and digitised at 2 kHz for 500 ms, 
recorded and analysed using PowerLab 4/35 (ADInstruments, Australia). 
 
Data Analysis. 
Although research suggests TMS obtains moderate to good reliability of 
MEP amplitude (Kamen, 2004), given the inherent variability of MEP amplitude, 
steps need to be taken to minimise the impact of both inter-individual and intra-
individual variation (Burke, Hicks, Stephen, Woodforth, & Crawford, 1995; 
Wassermann, 2002). Inter-individual variation, i.e. the variation between MEP 
amplitude from trial to trial, was addressed in the present study by evoking a 
number of MEPs within each experimental condition in order to gain a more 
representative measurement of MEP amplitude within that muscle for each 
participant (McDonnell, Ridding, & Miles, 2004).  
To account for intra-individual variation, data was standardised (i.e 
expressed as z scores) within each participant and within each muscle group (ZM, 
  61 
CS), attenuating the impact of highly reactive individuals on group scores and 
allowing for meaningful comparisons. As commonly employed in experimental 
paradigms utilising TMS (e.g. Funase, Tabira, Higashi, Liang, & Kasai, 2007; 
Garry, Loftus & Summers, 2005), transformation of the data to z-scores was made 
relative to each participant’s individual baseline for ZM and CS instead of 
standard z-scores in order to reflect a ratio of individual change. This was 
undertaken as standard z-scores reflect data in terms of their standard deviation 
(SD) points from the mean and thus would themselves have a mean of zero, 
yielding no effects. Further standardising to each individuals’ baseline for ZM 
and CS reflected their own change in MEP strength relative to their respective 
baseline. Thus, meaningful comparisons on the same scale in terms of SD points 
from their baseline measures were possible. The z-score transformations of 
individual MEPs relative to their respective baseline were calculated by taking the 
appropriate mean baseline score from each individual MEP in the two control and 
two experimental conditions for each muscle group and then dividing that by the 
standard deviation of their respective baseline (See Equation 1). 
 
     (Eqn. 1) 
 
Statistical Analysis.  
 Two ANOVA designs were used to compare Z score MEP amplitudes 
across condition and group; both being 2x2 mixed model ANOVAs (between 
subjects factor group in both: TD and ASD; while the within subject factor varied 
by condition: ZM neutral and ZM Happy in design one, and: CS neutral and CS 
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happy in design two). Where appropriate, planned comparisons were carried out 
to compare MEP amplitude across conditions within the same group.  
 
Results 
 
Data Screening. 
Data was cleaned, screened and analysed using SPSS Version 18 (SPSS 
Inc.) with no missing values found. Seven univariate outliers were identified 
using z-scores with a criterion of α <. 001, (z = ±3.3 cut-off). Hypothesis-related 
analyses were run with and without these outliers and as no meaningful difference 
was evident, the values were retained (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic indicated that all conditions were 
significantly non-normal. However an examination of the Q-Q plot for each 
condition did not suggest any significant deviations from normality. Thus, given 
the number of samples was large (n=320 MEPs per condition) it is likely that the 
significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic was due to the large number of samples 
rather than a true deviation from normality (Field, 2009). 
 
Zygomaticus Major Analysis. 
A 2x2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted in order to compare the TD 
and ASD group mean Z score MEP amplitudes across the conditions ZM-Neutral 
and ZM-Happy. Box’s test of equality of covariance’s matrices was violated 
(p<.001) and Levene’s test of equality of error variances was violated for the 
condition ZM-Neutral. Given the large sample with equal group sizes the analysis 
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was still believed to be appropriate, however in light of the violations a more 
stringent alpha of α <.001 was adopted (cf. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). There 
was a significant interaction between group and condition (F(1,318)=65.64, 
p<.0.001, ηp2= .17). The main effects for condition (F(1,318)=.43, p>.0.05, 
ηp2< .01) and group (F(1,318)=.99, p>.0.05, ηp2< .01) were not significant (see 
Figure 4.1 for plot).  
 
 
Figure 4.2 TD and ASD mean Z score MEP amplitudes across the conditions 
ZM-Neutral and ZM-Happy  
 
Simple main effects comparing condition within groups were undertaken 
using independent samples t-tests, adjusted for unequal variances where 
necessary. These indicated that within the TD group Z score MEP amplitude in 
the condition ZM-Happy was significantly higher than in the condition ZM-
Neutral (t(318)=-5.25, p<.001, ηp2=.09). In contract, the ASD groups Z score MEP 
amplitude in the condition ZM-Neutral was significantly higher than in the 
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condition ZM-Happy (t(304)=-5.16, p<.001, ηp2=0.08; see Table 4.1 for means and 
Figure 4.3 for sample MEPs).  
 
Table 4.1 
Mean Z Score MEP Amplitudes and Standard Deviations Normalized to Baseline 
for TD and ASD Groups for the Conditions ZM-Neutral and ZM-Happy  
 
   Group   
 TD  ASD 
Condition Mean SD  Mean SD 
ZM-Neutral -.21 1.52  .98 2.16 
ZM-Happy .75 1.74  -.15 1.74 
 
n = 160 MEPs per condition and 10 participants per group 
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Figure 4.3 Sample overlaid MEP amplitude sweeps recorded from one TD 
participant and one participant with an ASD for the conditions ZM-Neutral and 
ZM-Happy  
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Corrugator Supercilii Analysis. 
A 2x2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted in order to compare the TD 
and ASD group mean Z score MEP amplitudes across the conditions CS-Neutral 
and CS-Angry. Box’s test of equality of covariance’s matrices was violated 
(p<.001) and Levene’s test of equality of error variances was violated for the 
condition CS-Neutral. Given the large number of samples, with equal group sizes, 
the analysis was believed to be appropriate; however, in light of the violations a 
more stringent alpha of α<.001 was adopted (cf. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
There was a significant interaction between group and condition (F(1,318)=65.08, 
p<.001, ηp2=.17) and a significant main effect for group (F(1,318)=33.93, p<.001, 
ηp2= .10). The main effect for condition (F(1,318)=.52, p>.0.05, ηp2< .01) was not 
significant (see Figure 4.4 for plot).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 TD and ASD mean Z score MEP amplitudes across the conditions CS-
Neutral and CS-Angry  
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Simple main effects comparing condition within groups were undertaken 
using independent samples t-tests adjusted for unequal variances where necessary. 
These indicated that within the TD group Z score MEP amplitude in the condition 
CS-Angry was significantly higher than in the condition CS-Neutral (t(268)=-4.13, 
p<.001, ηp2=0.06). In contract, the ASD groups Z score MEP amplitude in the 
condition CS-Neutral was significantly higher than in the condition CS-Angry 
(t(318)=-4.27, p<.001, ηp2=0.05; see Table 4.2 for means and Figure 4.5 for sample 
MEPs). 
 
Table 4.2 
Mean Z Score MEP Amplitudes and Standard Deviations Normalised to Baseline 
for TD and ASD Groups for the Conditions CS-Neutral and CS-Angry  
 
   Group   
 TD  ASD 
Condition Mean SD  Mean SD 
CS-Neutral .48 1.46  .29 2.36 
CS-Angry 1.37 2.32  -.78 2.12 
 
n = 160 MEPs per condition and 10 participants per group 
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Figure 4.5 Sample overlaid MEP amplitude sweeps recorded from one TD 
participant and one participant with an ASD for the conditions CS-Neutral and 
CS-Angry  
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Discussion 
The present study utilised transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in an 
automatic mimicry paradigm to investigate automatic facial mimicry in typically 
developing (TD) individuals and individuals with an autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD) with respect to the mirror neuron system (MNS) as a possible neural 
substrate mediating this process. In line with theoretical tenets and previous 
findings (Enticott et al., 2008; McIntosh et al., 2006; Oberman et al., 2009), it was 
anticipated that TD individuals would actively engage in automatic mimicry of 
emotional facial expressions. The results supported this hypothesis, as 
demonstrated by a significant increase in motor evoked potential (MEP) 
amplitude in emotional conditions compared to neutral conditions. In contrast, it 
was anticipated that individuals with an ASD would demonstrate a lack of 
automatic mimicry of emotional facial expressions. Thus it was hypothesised that 
in participants with an ASD there would be no significant difference in MEP 
amplitude between emotion and control conditions. While the results supported 
the hypothesis that individuals with an ASD would not demonstrate automatic 
mimicry of emotional expressions, the results also suggested that individuals with 
an ASD might have an automatic mimicry response actively inhibited when 
viewing emotional stimuli. This was demonstrated by significantly lower MEP 
amplitude in both the happy and angry emotional conditions when compared to 
their respective neutral conditions.  
 It is important to note that the addition of TMS to electromyography 
(EMG) measures in the present study demonstrated the ability to not only capture 
and record rapid and automatic facial muscle reactions, but also obtain an 
understanding of the corticospinal changes believed to be a result of premotor 
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mirror neuron activity. Thus taken together, the results of this study provide 
valuable insight into the role of the MNS in both TD individuals and individuals 
with an ASD with respect to automatic mimicry.  
 The finding that TD individuals automatically mimic emotional facial 
expressions, as demonstrated by significantly larger MEPs in emotional 
conditions compared to neutral conditions, supports previous research and the 
view that social cognition is, at least partially, sub-served by the MNS (McIntosh 
et al., 2006; Oberman et al., 2009). Specifically the results suggest that during 
facial emotion processing, mirror neurons in the premotor cortex provide an 
internal simulation of the observed motoric behaviour that evokes a similar 
reaction in the corresponding muscles of the observer. It is believed that this 
simulation process allows TD individuals to understand the observed individual’s 
mental and affective state (Enticott et al., 2008), which in turn facilitates social 
functioning and communication (Uddin et al., 2007). This notion is further 
supported by empirical evidence demonstrating that in TD individuals, automatic 
mimicry is associated with greater levels of empathy, perspective taking and the 
understanding of other’s minds (McIntosh, 2006; Sonnby-Borgström, 2002).  
 Further strengthening the argument that automatic mimicry is important 
for social cognition and, at least in part, sub-served by the MNS, is the present 
finding that participants with an ASD, a disorder of social functioning, exhibited 
deficits in automatic mimicry of emotional facial expressions. In line with 
previous research, the present study found that when presented with emotional 
facial expressions participants with an ASD did not display the tendency to 
automatically mimic the expression with which they were presented (McIntosh et 
al., 2006; Stel, van den Heuvel & Smeets, 2008). Further, the present study found 
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that participants with an ASD exhibited significantly lower MEP amplitude when 
viewing emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. This suggests that when 
presented with stimuli that are emotional in nature an automatic mimicry response 
is actively inhibited in individuals with an ASD, supporting the notion that 
individuals with an ASD likely possess a disturbance in the MNS. Specifically, 
the present results support the inference that when individuals with an ASD view 
emotional facial expressions, reduced synaptic efficacy between premotor mirror 
neurons and corticospinal neurons suppresses activity in the facial region of the 
primary motor cortex (M1), in turn resulting in an inhibited response at the 
muscular level as evidenced by reduced MEP amplitude. This is supported by 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research demonstrating that when 
observing emotional facial expressions, children and adults with an ASD display 
reduced activation in the perceived premotor mirror neuron area compared to TD 
participants (Dapretto et al., 2006).  
The present findings raise important questions regarding the possible 
downstream consequences of a deficit in automatic mimicry in ASD. As 
discussed, it has been established that TD new born babies exhibit rudimentary 
forms of facial mimicry (Meltzoff & Moore, 1989). Further, in a normal 
developmental trajectory these behaviours increase in complexity and form the 
basis for future social development by providing the individual with information 
about the actions and intentions of others (Rodgers et al., 2003) Thus, if a 
mimicry deficit occurred early in the developmental trajectory of a child with an 
ASD not only would automatic mimicry behaviour be significantly impaired but 
this could consequently impair the child’s ability to co-experience other’s 
emotional states (McIntosh et al., 2006). This deficit in emotional contagion may 
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subsequently prevent the child with an ASD from developing a sense of inter 
subjectivity and emotional correspondence which are essential for social learning 
and the understanding of other minds (Bandura, 1977; Meltzoff, 1999). As a 
consequence, this in turn could impair the development of higher order socio-
communicative abilities such as empathy, emotional reciprocity and theory of 
mind (ToM), disturbances of which characterise ASD (APA, 2013).  
When interpreting the findings of the present study, a number of 
limitations should be considered. As the sample size was modest, replication in 
larger samples is needed to more firmly establish the present findings. Further as 
the present sample only included male adults the results are therefore limited in 
their generalizability, thus any developmental inferences drawn are done so 
speculatively. Thus, given the developmental significance of automatic mimicry 
behaviours, future research needs to further investigate these abilities in child and 
adolescent TD and ASD populations in order to establish the developmental 
trajectory of these behaviours with respect to the MNS. Another limitation of the 
present study is the narrow range of emotions utilised. While the present study 
utilised one positive and one negative emotion, happiness and anger respectively, 
which are easily identified by the TD and ASD populations, future research 
should employ this methodology to examine a wider range of emotions.  
Another potential limitation of the present study is that an alternative 
explanation for the results could be posited. Specifically it could be argued that 
participants with an ASD did not engage in automatic mimicry of facial 
expressions due to either inattention to the stimuli presented or by differential 
face processing, reflected in a failure to attend to the eye region (Gross, 2004). 
However there are several reasons as to why these explanations are unlikely. 
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Firstly, automatic mimicry of facial expressions has been shown even when the 
stimuli was presented outside of awareness, and thus before participants could 
consciously attend to it (Dimberg et al., 2000). Secondly, research has shown that 
the presence of automatic mimicry of facial expressions is not dependent on the 
participant directing their attention to the gaze of the stimulus model, as mimicry 
has been observed to occur even when the participant was observing a model 
attending to an emotional stimulus, as opposed to the observer (McIntosh, 2006). 
Further, one of the emotional expressions utilised in the present was smiling. As 
smiling requires the observer to attend to the lower regions of the face, which 
individuals with an ASD do attend to (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 
2002), it is very unlikely that the results are solely due to participants with an 
ASD failing to attend to the eye regions of the face (Gross, 2004; McIntosh, 
2006). Given this, it is posited that mimicry is an innate or fairly automatized 
response. Thus the differences obtained between TD participants and participants 
with an ASD in the present study are likely a true reflection of differences in the 
functioning of the MNS as opposed to differences in attention or face processing. 
However future research should utilise eye-tracking equipment in order to entirely 
rule out this possibility.  
In conclusion, the present findings converge with previous research 
highlighting that automatic mimicry, a basic feature of social interaction, is 
impaired in ASD. Further, the results provide support that social cognition may, at 
least in part, be sub-served by the MNS and that disturbances in this system likely 
contribute to the social communicative disturbances observed in ASD. Although 
more research is required to elucidate the link between social cognition, the MNS 
and ASD, the present study raises several questions regarding the possible 
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downstream consequences that may result from imitative deficits early in 
development and the role disturbances in the MNS may play in this. As such the 
present study sheds light on processes that shape social cognition in both the 
typical and atypical social mind as well as highlighting possible neural substrates 
that mediate this process.  
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Chapter 5: Contagious Yawning and Autism Spectrum Disorder 
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Introduction 
Spontaneous yawning is a phylogenetically old, yet complex stereotyped 
motor behaviour that is observed in most vertebrate species from foetal stages to 
old age. Although the act of yawning spontaneously is widespread among species 
(Baenninger, 1997), the onset of a yawn triggered by seeing, hearing or even 
thinking about yawning has only been observed consistently in species that 
demonstrate the capacity for empathy and self-awareness, such as humans 
(Provine, 1986) chimpanzees (Anderson, Myowa-Yamakoshi, & Matsuzawa, 
2004) and stumptail macaques (Paukner & Anderson, 2006). In contrast to 
spontaneous yawning, in humans, yawning contagion may not appear until at least 
the second year after birth (Anderson & Meno, 2003; Piaget, 1951) and typically 
occurs in approximately 40%-60% of the population (Platek, Critton, Myers, & 
Gallup, 2003). Thus suggesting not only a higher level of complexity but also a 
high degree of both evolutionary and developmental specialisation. In light of 
this, current hypotheses on the evolution and function of contagious yawning 
focus on its potential role in social interaction, communication and the 
development of empathy (Platek et al., 2003). Specifically it is posited that the 
contagiousness of yawning depends on mechanisms that develop during 
childhood in parallel with the empathic capacity to understand mental states of 
others (Guggisberg, Mathis, Schnider, & Hess, 2010).  
Despite the unique opportunity contagious yawning offers to explore the 
neurological roots of social behaviour, empathy and imitation, little research has 
been undertaken to elucidate the origin of this phenomenon. A thorough 
understanding of the neural underpinnings of contagious yawning is necessary as 
it could provide considerable insight into the behavioural and communicative 
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systems of both human and non-human species, and may be particularly relevant 
to revealing the possible pathology of these processes in disorders of social and 
communicative functioning such as autism spectrum disorders (ASD).  
In line with the contention that contagious yawning reflects a basic 
capacity for empathy, recent studies have linked individual differences in 
empathic tendencies to differences in yawning contagion (Platek et al., 2003). For 
example, Platek and colleagues demonstrated that increased susceptibility to 
contagious yawning was associated with greater self-recognition abilities and 
better performance on theory of mind (ToM) tasks. This is further supported by 
cross species research in chimpanzees, finding that greater yawning contagion 
was associated with greater self-recognition and increased grooming behaviour, 
both of which are viewed as an index for the capacity of empathy (Anderson et 
al., 2004).  
Consistent with the link between contagious yawning and its potential role 
in social and communicative abilities such as mental state attribution, automatic 
mimicry and the development of empathy, is the observation that individuals with 
an ASD, who exhibit impairments in these processes, also demonstrate 
disturbances in the tendency to yawn contagiously (Giganti, & Ziello, 2009; Helt, 
Eigsti, Snyder, & Fein, 2010; Senju, Maeda, Kikuchi, Hasegawa, Tojo, & Osanai, 
2007). For example, several studies have demonstrated that although there is no 
difference in TD individuals and individuals with an ASD in the tendency to 
yawn spontaneously, when observing videos of others yawning, TD individuals 
exhibit significantly more yawns in comparison to control mouth movements. In 
contrast, studies have shown that often children and adolescents with an ASD 
display an absence of contagious yawning when viewing others yawn (Giganti, & 
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Ziello, 2009; Helt et al., 2010; Senju, et al., 2007). It is important to note that it 
has been suggested that the observed absence of a contagious effect when 
individuals with an ASD view others yawn, could be due to their difficulty in 
establishing reciprocal gaze (Volkmar & Mayes, 1990). However, as research has 
demonstrated that listening to the sound of others yawning also elicits contagious 
yawning in TD individuals but not individuals with an ASD, this suggests the 
relative absence of contagious yawning in ASD is more than just atypical 
orienting to social stimuli (Senju, Kikuchi, Akechi, Hasegawa, Tojo, & Osanai, 
2009). Instead, likely reflecting a possible impairment in the neural mechanism 
relevant to the capacity for contagious yawning. 
Although different neuroimaging studies have reported divergent areas to 
be implicated in contagious yawning, all appear to be part of a distributed neural 
network related to empathy and social behaviour. For instance, Platek, Mohamed 
and Gallup (2005) found that viewing someone yawn evoked unique neural 
activity in the posterior cingulate and precuneus, both of which are linked to self-
processing abilities and believed to be part of the neural network involved in 
empathy. Additionally, ventromedial prefrontal cortex activation, an area 
previously implicated in empathic processing (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger & 
Aharon-Peretz, 2003), has been associated with the urge to yawn when viewing 
another yawn in a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study 
(Nahab, Hattori, Saad & Hallett, 2009). Activity in core components of the social 
brain, including the superior temporal sulcus and peri-amygdalar regions 
(Brothers, 2002), have also been reported in response to yawning susceptibility 
during the observation of others yawns (Schürmann et al., 2005). Lastly, although 
controversial, specific cortical cells that respond to both the execution and 
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observation of motoric behaviour, known as mirror neurons, (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004) have also been linked to contagious yawning (Haker, Kawohl, 
Herwig, & Rössler, 2012).  
The mirror neuron system (MNS) is postulated to be involved in yawning 
contagion as it provides a basis for action understanding (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004) and may form part of the neural substrate that underlies imitative actions 
(Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange & Keenan, 2007), both of which are capacities relevant 
to the phenomenon of contagious yawning. Further, as mirror neurons are 
believed to allow for the simulation of not just another individual’s intentions, but 
also their state of mind, it has been speculated that mirror neurons are involved in 
social cognition processes such as the development of empathy and ToM skills 
(Enticott, Johnston, Herring, Hoy & Fitzgerald, 2008). Again, supporting a 
putative link between the MNS and yawning contagion, as contagious yawning is 
believed to be part of the neural network involved in empathic skills (Platek et al., 
2005). In addition, research also suggests that a faulty MNS may underlie many 
of the social deficits observed in ASD, a population that demonstrates 
disturbances in both empathic abilities and contagious yawning (Enticott et al., 
2008; Giganti, & Ziello, 2009).  
Despite the theorised importance of the MNS, neuroimaging evidence to 
date is mixed and consequently there is disagreement in the literature as to the 
possible role of the MNS in contagious yawning. For example, several fMRI 
studies have found areas of activation that are believed to comprise the MNS not 
only when viewing videos of other’s yawning but also during control conditions 
(Nahab, et al., 2009; Platek et al., 2005; Schürmann et al., 2005). As a result, the 
authors generally concluded that given mirror neuron activity was not specific to 
  80 
yawning, instead occurring the same amount during other movements, contagious 
yawning must therefore occur independently of the MNS. However, it should be 
highlighted that these studies employed control conditions that were arguably 
mirror neuron stimulating in nature such as laughter and ‘non-nameable mouth 
movements’ (Cooper et al., 2012). Thus, the design of the control conditions 
likely masked any specific contribution of the MNS to contagious yawning. To 
date, only two neuroimaging studies have demonstrated MNS involvement 
specific to contagious yawning (Arnott, Singhal, & Goodale, 2009; Haker et al., 
2012). In contrast to previous fMRI studies, Arnott and colleagues (2009) 
employed an auditory paradigm where they compared yawn sounds with 
electronically scrambled versions of the same sounds. The authors found greater 
activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus, a core area of the MNS, during the 
yawn condition compared to the control condition. Further, the urge to yawn was 
also positively correlated with individual’s empathy scores. In a recent fMRI 
study, Haker and colleagues (2012) also found greater activation in the right 
inferior frontal gyrus during the yawn condition compared to the control 
conditions. However their paradigm compared videos of yawning faces to neutral 
facial expressions. Thus, the results of both these studies suggest that the lack of 
specific mirror neuron activation in response to yawn stimuli in previous studies 
was likely the result of experimental design rather than a lack of involvement of 
the MNS in contagious yawning. 
In a further attempt to address the discrepancies in neuroimaging 
investigations of contagious yawning, Cooper and colleagues utilised 
electroencephalography (EEG) as it affords higher temporal resolution than fMRI, 
as well as measuring mu wave suppression, a readily identifiable index of MNS 
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activation (Cooper et al., 2012). Mu rhythm is an EEG waveform recorded from 
the motor cortical areas that is suppressed not only when a person makes a 
voluntary movement but also when they observe another individual performing a 
voluntary movement. As the mu rhythm is generated by activity in the 
sensorimotor areas, and mirror neurons are believed to be located in the premotor 
cortex, it is thought that the suppression of the mu rhythm reflects a downstream 
modulation of primary sensorimotor areas by the MNS (Pineda, 2005). Thus, it is 
believed that mu wave suppression in response to observed actions can be used as 
a selective measure of activity in the MNS (Oberman et al., 2005). In light of this, 
Cooper et al. (2012) completed several experiments where they exposed 
participants to yawning and control stimuli whilst measuring changes in mu 
activation via EEG. The authors found greater mu suppression over the right 
motor and premotor areas when participants viewed videos of yawns compared to 
control stimuli, particularly in individuals who scored higher on empathy 
measures. They also reported a similar effect when audio recordings of yawns 
were presented and compared to electronically scrambled versions of the same 
yawn, observing greater mu suppression over the right lateral premotor areas 
when yawns were presented compared to control stimuli. The results from this 
study support the notion that the MNS is, at least in part, involved in yawning 
contagion and emphasises the link between contagious yawning and empathy.  
While Cooper et al. (2012) provides valuable insights into the possible 
role of the MNS in contagious yawning, their finding also highlights the need for 
future research to employ alternative methods to neuroimaging. Given the 
putative link between empathy and the MNS and the deficits observed in both 
contagious yawning and empathy in ASDs, it is essential that future research 
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examine the possible role of the MNS in contagious yawning not just in TD 
individuals but also in individuals with an ASD. In an attempt to address these 
gaps, the present study aimed to investigate the role of the MNS in contagious 
yawning in both TD individuals and individuals with an ASD utilising an 
alternative means to neuroimaging, namely transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS).  
TMS is a means of stimulating nerve cells in the motor cortex via the 
administration of a brief magnetic pulse to the scalp. This pulse produces a motor 
evoked potential (MEP) in the specific muscle stimulated that can be measured 
via surface electromyography (EMG). As the premotor cortex extends posteriorly 
to the primary motor cortex, mirror neurons in the ventral premotor cortex are 
believed to connect sensory neurons responding to the visual properties of an 
observed action and corticospinal neurons that discharge MEPs during the 
execution of a similar action (Fadiga, Craighero & Olivier, 2005; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004; Zult, Howatson, Kádár, Farthing & Hortobágyi, 2013). Thus, 
when TMS is delivered during the observation of action within the stimulated 
muscle, it is believed that premotor mirror neuron activity increases excitability in 
the motor cortex resulting in enhanced MEP amplitudes.  
The present paradigm utilised TMS to stimulate the cortical region of the 
motor cortex corresponding to the facial muscles engaged during a yawn, and 
using surface EMG to assess spontaneous muscle activation in the corresponding 
muscles of the face. It was hypothesised that TD individuals would display the 
capacity for contagious yawning as demonstrated by increased MEP amplitude 
when viewing others yawn compared to control mouth movements. Further, it 
was also hypothesised that individuals with an ASD would exhibit a lack of 
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yawning contagion as demonstrated by no difference in MEP amplitude between 
yawn and control conditions. 
 
Method 
 
Participants. 
Participants were ten typically developing male adults (TD) and ten male 
adults with a diagnosis of either high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger’s 
syndrome (AS). One TD participant was excluded due to equipment malfunction. 
Participants with HFA/AS (M=23.3) were age stratified to TD participants 
(M=24.4) within 3 years (age range 18-34). The mean age and SD of all 
participants was 23.8 and 3.9 respectively. TD participants were recruited by 
word of mouth and at Deakin University. Participants with HFA/AS were 
recruited from Autism Victoria’s research database, schools such as the Western 
Autistic School, word of mouth, and advertisements and mail outs from paediatric 
clinics. An experienced Clinical Psychologist who has worked extensively in the 
autism field confirmed diagnosis using DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria. 
All participants were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Prior to the experimental procedures, participants completed the Adult 
Safety Screening Questionnaire to determine their suitability for transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS; Keel, Smith & Wassermann, 2001). The TMS safety 
screen was used to exclude participants who had any pre-existing medical 
conditions (such as epilepsy or stroke), or any implanted devices (such as cardiac 
pacemakers), which may have resulted in adverse effects from TMS (see 
Appendix A). 
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The Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DUHREC 
2009-135) granted ethics approval in accordance with the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) prior to the commencement of this 
research (see Appendix B). All participants were provided with the plain language 
statement (PLS) and gave written, informed consent prior to engaging in the 
experimental procedures (see Appendix C). 
 
Stimuli. 
The stimuli utilised were two videos with sound, one consisting of male 
actors completing a yawn and one consisting of the same actors completing a 
control mouth action where they continually said the sound ‘oww’. The control 
mouth action was selected as the sound and mouth movement was similar to that 
of a yawn. During the recording of the yawn stimuli, yawns were induced by 
talking about yawning and pretending to yawn, until natural yawns occurred. 
Those genuine yawns were then selected as stimuli. Four male actors completed 
the mouth actions in both videos. Each mouth action segment was eight seconds 
in duration and was repeated twice. Thus each video contained eight mouth 
actions. Following each mouth action segment was a 15 second inter-stimulus 
interval where a black screen with a white central fixation cross was presented. 
The videos appeared on a 10 cm by 10 cm display presented on a 13-inch laptop 
computer screen placed approximately 60 cm away from the participant.  
Coordinated with the timed presentation of the mouth action segments was 
a pre-recorded sound that was elicited once each segment had been running for 
four seconds. The sound indicated to the experimenter to deliver a TMS pulse and 
allowed for consistency of TMS delivery across all stimuli presentation.  
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Experimental Design.  
There were three conditions within the experiment: baseline, control and 
experimental. In all conditions electrodes were placed on the masseter muscle on 
the left side of the jaw and the identified optimal position on the primary motor 
cortex (M1) to elicit motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in this muscle was 
stimulated. Before each condition participants were instructed simply to ‘watch 
the screen’.  
In the baseline condition participants were presented with a black screen 
with a white central fixation cross. During this condition eight MEPs were taken 
while the participant simply viewed the screen. The baseline condition examined 
individual participants resting MEP amplitude in the masseter muscle.  
In the control condition participants were presented with the video 
containing eight control mouth movements lasting for eight seconds each. During 
this condition eight MEPs were taken while the participant viewed the video. 
Each mouth action was followed by a 15 second inter-stimulus interval where a 
black screen with a white central fixation cross was presented.  
Similarly, in the experimental condition participants were presented with 
eight yawning mouth actions, with eight MEPs taken in the same manner as the 
control condition.  
The order of conditions was always baseline, followed by control followed 
lastly by the experimental condition. The yawning condition was always last as 
residual yawns could interfere with subsequent conditions. 
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Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and Electromyography. 
Surface electromyography (EMG) activity and TMS evoked motor evoked 
potentials (MEPs) were recorded from the left masseter muscles in the jaw using 
bipolar Ag-AgCl electrodes. Please refer to the transcranial magnetic stimulation 
and electromyography section in chapter four (pages 58-60) for a more detailed 
description of the methods employed. 
 
Data Analysis. 
Data was standardised (i.e. expressed as z scores) within each participant, 
attenuating the impact of highly reactive individuals on group scores and allowing 
for meaningful comparisons. Please refer to the data analysis section in chapter 
four (pages 60-61) for the equation utilised and a more detailed description of the 
statistical transformation employed. 
 
Statistical Analysis.  
 A 2x2 mixed model ANOVA (within subjects factor condition: control 
and experimental and between subjects factor group: TD and ASD) was used to 
compare Z score MEP amplitudes across condition and group. Where appropriate, 
planned comparisons were carried out to compare MEP amplitude across 
conditions within the same group and between groups within the same condition.  
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Results 
 
Data Screening. 
Data was cleaned, screened and analysed using SPSS Version 18 (SPSS 
Inc.) with no missing values found. Two univariate outliers were identified using 
z-scores with a criterion of α <. 001, (±3.3 cut-off). Hypothesis-related analyses 
were run with and without these outliers and as no meaningful difference was 
evident, the outliers were retained (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic indicated that all conditions were 
normally distributed.  
 
Analysis of Motor Evoked Potential Amplitudes. 
A 2x2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted in order to compare the TD 
and ASD group mean Z score MEP amplitudes across the control mouth 
movement condition and the yawning mouth movement condition. Box’s test of 
equality of covariance’s matrices and Levene’s test of equality of error variances 
were within acceptable limits. There was a significant interaction between group 
and condition (F(1,158)=30.46, p<.001, ηp2 = .16) and a significant main effect for 
condition (F(1,158)=10.03, p<.002, ηp2 = .06) and group (F(1,158)=21.65, p<.001,  
ηp2 = .12 ; see Figure 5.1 for plot).  
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Figure 5.1 TD and ASD mean Z score MEP amplitudes across the control mouth 
movement and yawning mouth movement conditions.  
Simple main effects comparing condition both within groups and between 
groups were undertaken using independent samples t-tests. These indicated that 
within the TD group, mean Z score MEP amplitude in the yawning condition was 
significantly higher than in the control mouth movement condition, (t(158)=-5.43, 
p<.001, ηp2=.16). Although within the ASD group, the mean Z score MEP 
amplitude in the control mouth movement condition was higher than in the 
yawning condition, this difference was not significant (t(158)=1.72, p>.05, 
ηp2=0.018).  
Within the control mouth movement condition, Z score MEP amplitude 
did not differ significantly between groups (t(158)=-.25, p>.05, ηp2=.00). However, 
within the yawning condition Z score MEP amplitude for the TD group was 
significantly higher than for the ASD group (t(158)=7.52, p<.001, ηp2=.26; see 
Table 5.1 for means and Figure 5.2 for sample MEPs).
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Table 5.1 
Mean MEP Amplitudes and Standard Deviations Normalised to Baseline for TD 
and ASD Groups for the Control Mouth Movement and Yawning Conditions  
   Group   
 TD  ASD 
Condition Mean SD  Mean SD 
Control -.59 2.32  -.50 1.83 
Yawning 1.25 1.95  -1.00 1.84 
 
n = 80 MEPs per condition and 10 participants per group 
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Figure 5.2 Sample overlaid MEP amplitude sweeps recorded from one TD 
participant and one participant with an ASD for the control mouth movement and 
yawning mouth movement conditions  
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Discussion 
The present study utilised transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to 
investigate contagious yawning in typically developing (TD) individuals and 
individuals with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) with respect to the mirror 
neuron system (MNS) as a possible neural substrate facilitating this phenomenon. 
In line with theoretical tenets and previous findings, it was anticipated that TD 
individuals would display the capacity for contagious yawning. The results 
supported this hypothesis, as demonstrated by a significant increase in motor 
evoked potential (MEP) amplitude when viewing yawns compared to control 
mouth movements. In contrast, it was anticipated that individuals with an ASD 
would demonstrate a lack of yawning contagion. Again, the results supported this 
hypothesis, as the MEP amplitude when viewing yawns and control mouth 
movements did not differ significantly in participants with an ASD.  
It is important to note that the addition of TMS to electromyography 
(EMG) measures in the present study demonstrated the ability to not only capture 
and record rapid and automatic facial muscle reactions, but also obtain an 
understanding of cortical changes in the primary motor cortex (M1) believed to be 
a result of premotor mirror neuron activity. Taken together, the results of this 
study provide valuable insight into the role of the MNS in both TD individuals 
and individuals with an ASD with respect to yawning contagion.  
Firstly, the finding that TD individuals displayed the capacity for yawning 
contagion, as demonstrated by significantly larger MEPs when viewing yawns 
compared to control mouth movements, supports previous research and the view 
that the MNS plays a role in contagious yawning (Cooper et al., 2012; Haker et 
al., 2012). Specifically the results suggest that when viewing another’s yawn, 
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mirror neurons in the premotor cortex provide an internal simulation of the 
observed motoric behaviour, evoking a similar reaction in the corresponding 
muscles of the observer. Thus, it is believed that this system may underlie the 
contagious aspects of the phenomenon. However previous neuroimaging research 
examining the role of the MNS in contagious yawning has resulted in mixed 
findings.  
The present results align with Arnott et al.’s (2009) and Haker et al.’s 
(2012) findings, who both found greater activation in specific mirror neuron areas 
in yawning conditions compared to control conditions. Further, the present results 
also support the only study to date to utilise EEG to investigate contagious 
yawning, again finding evidence of MNS activity during yawn conditions but not 
control conditions (Cooper et al., 2012). As suggested previously, the present 
results support the argument that the neuroimaging studies that failed to 
demonstrate MNS activation specific to yawning stimuli were likely the result of 
experimental design rather than the lack of involvement of the MNS in contagious 
yawning. Specifically it was proposed that the control conditions utilised in these 
studies were arguably mirror neuron stimulating in nature, resulting in MNS 
activation in both yawn and control conditions (Nahab, et al., 2009; Platek et al., 
2005; Schürmann et al., 2005). As both the present study and that of Cooper and 
colleagues (2012) demonstrated MNS activity specific to contagious yawning and 
given both studies utilised alternative methods to neuroimaging it is likely that 
this was because EEG and TMS measure different expressions of MNS activation 
compared to neuroimaging techniques. This again suggests that the previous 
fMRI studies that failed to observe the specific involvement of the MNS in 
contagious yawning was the result of the neuroimaging paradigm employed rather 
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than a true reflection of the MNS perceived lack of specific involvement in 
yawning contagion. 
Further strengthening the argument that the MNS is important in 
contagious yawning is the present studies finding that participants with an ASD, a 
population theorised to possess a deficit in this system, demonstrated disturbances 
in the capacity to yawn contagiously. In line with previous research, the present 
study found that when viewing others yawns, individuals with an ASD displayed 
a disturbance in the ability to yawn contagiously (Giganti & Esposito, 2009; Helt 
et al., 2010; Senju et al., 2007). Specifically, the present findings support the 
inference that when individuals with an ASD view the yawn of another, reduced 
synaptic efficacy between premotor mirror neurons and corticospinal neurons, fail 
to activate the corresponding facial region of the M1 cortex, in turn failing to 
elicit a corresponding response at the muscular level as evidenced by similar MEP 
amplitude when viewing both yawns and control mouth movements. 
It is important to highlight that it has been suggested that the observed 
lack of yawning contagion in ASD could be the result of a failure to fixate on the 
eye region when viewing a yawn as opposed to a true deficit in the neural 
substrate mediating yawning contagion (Senju et al., 2009). However, given the 
present paradigm utilised yawning stimuli that included sound as well as the 
visual image and, previous studies have demonstrated that listening to the sound 
of others yawning elicits contagious yawning in TD individuals but not 
individuals with an ASD (Giganti & Ziello, 2009), this alternative explanation is 
unlikely.  
Taken together, the results of the present study provide tentative support 
for the notion that contagious yawning and the capacity for empathy share 
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common neural mechanisms. As described earlier, the results of the present study 
support the claim that the MNS plays a role in yawning contagion and that a 
deficit within this system may, at least in part, explain why individuals with an 
ASD display an absence of contagious yawning when viewing others yawn. 
Additionally, given individuals with an ASD also exhibit disturbances in 
empathic processing, the present study further supports previous literature linking 
contagious yawning to empathic abilities (Cooper et al., 2012) as well as research 
correlating empathy with MNS activation (Kaplan & Iacobonni, 2006). 
Specifically the present findings not only tentatively support the belief that 
yawning contagion reflects an index for empathic abilities but also that these 
processes are, at least in part, linked to the MNS. In addition to the inferences 
made from evidence in ASD populations, this notion is further supported by cross 
species research suggesting that mirror neurons are only suspected in certain 
populations and that these appear to be the same populations that exhibit both the 
tendency to yawn contagiously and possess the capacity for empathy (Anderson et 
al., 2004; Paukner & Anderson, 2006).  
When interpreting the findings of the present study, a number of 
limitations should be considered. As the sample size was modest, replication in 
larger samples is needed to more firmly establish the present findings. Further, as 
the present sample only included male adults, the results are therefore limited in 
their generalizability and developmental inferences can only be done so 
speculatively. Thus, given the differential developmental of contagious yawning 
compared to spontaneous yawning, future research needs to investigate the 
developmental trajectory of contagious yawning in line with the development of 
the MNS by utilising child and adolescent, as well as female populations. Another 
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limitation of the present study was the likelihood that the control stimuli utilised 
was still not optimal and may have also activated the MNS, possibly diluting the 
findings. The development of an ideal control condition for yawns remains 
elusive and needs to be addressed in future research.  
In conclusion, the present findings support the notion that the MNS is, at 
least in part, involved in yawning contagion and emphasises the link between 
contagious yawning and empathy. Further, the present study also supports the 
putative link between abnormalities of the MNS in individuals with an ASD and 
observed impairments in social and communicative functioning such as 
disturbances in empathic abilities. Although more research is required to elucidate 
the developmental properties of contagious yawning and the possible neural 
mechanisms involved, the present study raises the possibility that contagious 
yawning could be utilised as a simple measure of empathic abilities and perhaps 
even a clinically important neurological characteristic used in the diagnosis of 
ASD.  
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Chapter 6: Self-Other Processes in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
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Introduction  
A sense of body ownership and self-awareness is imperative not only for 
the development of essential motor skills such as navigating one’s environment, 
but it also plays a fundamental role in the social and cognitive abilities that 
necessitate both the differentiation of self from other, as well as comparisons 
between self and other (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Meltzoff, 2007; Piaget, 
1952). This ability to identify, differentiate and compare the self and other is 
perceived to be an important condition for the understanding of others as 
intentional agents, subsequently giving rise to the ability to make inferences 
regarding others emotions, thoughts and intentions (Cascio, Foss-Feig, Burnette, 
Heacock & Cosby, 2012). These skills are in turn believed to be foundational for 
the development of social relational skills such as imitation and empathy (Gallese, 
Keysers, & Rizzolatti 2004). Thus, the distinction between the self and other is an 
essential prerequisite in human social interaction, and disturbances in this process 
can result in a number of social and communicative deficits such as those seen in 
autism spectrum disorders (ASD; Williams, 2008).  
In recent years attempts to understand how one differentiates between the 
self and others has received increasing interest from the fields of neurobiology 
and neuroscience (Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange & Keenan, 2007; van Veluw & 
Chance, 2013). While the underlying neural mechanisms still remain unclear, the 
recent discovery of specific cortical brain cells that respond to both the execution 
and observation of motoric behaviour has offered promising insights into the 
possible neural mechanisms by which the brain distinguishes and compares the 
self and others (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). It is proposed that this system, 
known as the mirror neuron system (MNS), facilitates action understanding by 
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allowing for the simulation of not just another individual’s intentions, but also 
their state of mind, which is then believed to inform subsequent interactions 
(Enticott, Johnston, Herring, Hoy & Fitzgerald, 2008). As a result, it has been 
speculated that mirror neurons are involved in the development of social 
cognition processes that facilitate effective social interactions including the 
development of self-other representations, empathy, theory of mind (ToM) and 
imitation (Enticott et al., 2008; Fecteau, Lepage & Théoret, 2006; Uddin et al., 
2007).  
In addition to the empirical evidence supporting the link between the MNS 
and social cognition in typically developing (TD) individuals (e.g. Agnew, 
Bhakoo & Puri, 2007; Oberman, Pineda, & Ramachandran, 2007; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004), there is also evidence suggesting a deficit in this system may be 
linked to the social and communicative deficits that form the hallmark of the ASD 
(e.g. Buccino & Amore, 2008; Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder & Tager-Flusberg, 
2006; Théoret et al., 2005). For example, a study completed by Théoret et al. 
(2005) demonstrated that observation of movement in TD individuals’ selectively 
enhanced motor activity specific to the muscles required to reproduce that 
movement, whereas this modulation was abnormal in ASD participants. 
Specifically, ASD participants displayed typical patterns of motor activation 
when performing the observed action and when viewing another completing the 
same action from the allocentric (other) perspective. However when that same 
action was viewed from the egocentric (self) perspective, ASD participant’s failed 
to show motor facilitation in the specific muscles required to reproduce this 
action. These findings imply a mirror-related deficit in self-awareness that affects 
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self-other processing in ASDs, thus providing support for the possible role of the 
MNS in our ability to differentiate and compare the self and other. 
Whilst there have been recent advances in our conceptual understanding 
of how the brain processes information attributed to the self, compared to another, 
as the experience of one's own body differs from that of others' bodies with 
respect to viewpoint, morphological features, familiarity, and the hallmark feature 
of kinaesthetic experience, these hypotheses have proved exceedingly difficult to 
empirically investigate. Despite these challenges, several researchers have 
attempted to manipulate body ownership by utilising perceptual illusions such as 
the rubber hand illusion (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Schütz-Bosbach, 
Mancini, Aglioti, & Haggard, 2006).   
The RHI relies on the premise that the sense of self versus other is 
dependent on converging input from the proprioceptive, somatosensory and visual 
systems and that this process can be disrupted when inputs from two or more of 
these systems are in conflict (Botvinick, 2004; Schütz-Bosbach, Musil & 
Haggard, 2009). Specifically, in the RHI, the sense of body ownership is altered 
by delivering synchronous tactile stimulation to both an artificial limb placed in 
full view of the participant and their real hand, which is hidden. After a short 
period of synchronous touches the participant experiences a drift in perceived 
position of the tactile stimulation from their actual hand to the virtual limb, 
consequently resulting in feelings of ownership (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). In 
TD individuals the illusion is believed to occur as the result of the interaction 
between vision, touch and proprioception (position sense) and the dominance of 
vision over proprioception (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998).   
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Given the RHIs ability to manipulate the distinction between self and 
other, one would theorise that populations with disturbances in self-other 
representations, such as those with ASD, would likely display differences in RHI 
susceptibility when compared to TD populations. However, despite the perceived 
utility of the RHI in the investigation of self-other processes in ASD, few studies 
have utilised this paradigm. Despite the constraints of the literature, several 
studies suggest that individuals with ASD demonstrate diminished susceptibility 
to the illusionary experience of the RHI (Cascio et al., 2012; Paton, Hohwy, & 
Enticott et al., 2012). Further, the experience of the RHI in individuals with ASD 
has also been correlated with empathic abilities, with individuals who rate low on 
this ability being less likely to experience the illusion (Cascio et al., 2012). Thus, 
understanding the neural mechanisms involved in perceptual illusions such as the 
RHI, will not only improve our understanding of the mechanisms involved in 
cognitive abilities such as empathy and intention understanding, but it will also 
assist in elucidating how these processes are disturbed in ASD.  
Insights into the possible neural underpinnings and the role of the MNS in 
illusions of body ownership have come from closely related work by 
Ramachandran and colleagues examining phantom limb sensations in amputees 
(Ramachandran, Rogers-Ramachandran, & Cobb, 1995). Specifically, 
Ramachandran et al. (1995) asked phantom limb patients to view their intact arm 
in a mirror, so that their amputated arm appeared to have been restored. Several 
subjects reported than when viewing the reflection of the intact arm being 
touched, they felt the touch in the amputated limb. In addition to its therapeutic 
use to relive pain in phantom limb patients, this mirror paradigm has also been 
adapted to complete a modified version of the RHI in TD populations as well as 
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amputees, where the mirrored reflection functions as a virtual limb as opposed to 
the use of an artificial rubber limb in the traditional RHI (Bertamini, Berselli, 
Bode, Lawson, & Wong, 2011; Giummarra, Georgiou-Karistianis, Nicholls, 
Gibson & Bradshaw, 2010).  
As stated previously, the sensation of feeling a foreign limb as belonging 
to the self during perceptual illusions such as the RHI and mirror-induced visual 
illusions (MVI), is believed to be the result of visual information taking 
preference over incongruent tactile and proprioception senses. Moreover, 
Ramachandran and colleagues take this one step further by postulating the neural 
mechanisms that facilitate this process (Ramachandran & Brang, 2009). 
Specifically they purport that the reason we do not experience this feeling simply 
through the observation of tactile stimulation in the absence of any illusionary 
conditions is that negative feedback created from touch senses in the arm causes a 
‘dampening’ of the MNS from reaching a threshold for feeling (Ramachandran & 
Brang, 2009). However, during perceptual illusions they posit that this signal is 
vetoed, allowing mirror neuron activity to reach threshold, subsequently giving 
rise to the perception of feeling a foreign limb as belonging to the self. Support 
for this contention comes from fMRI investigations in TD individuals, which 
suggest a linear relationship between the strength of the RHI experience and 
activity in the premotor cortex, a proposed component of the MNS (Ehrsson, 
Spence, & Passingham, 2004). Further, although indirect, evidence form 
converging lines of research, suggesting that ASD individuals display both 
decreased susceptibility to the RHI (Cascio et al., 2012; Paton, et al., 2012) and 
disturbances within the MNS (Buccino & Amore, 2008; Hadjikhani, et al., 2006; 
Théoret et al., 2005), provides additional support for the MNS possible 
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involvement in the mechanism by which the brain distinguishes between the self 
and others.  
Although pursuing a different line of inquiry, evidence for the 
involvement of the MNS in self-other processes has come from studies utilising 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) whilst individuals participate in a MVI 
(Funase, Tabira, Higashi, Liang, & Kasai, 2007; Garry, Loftus, & Summers, 
2005). TMS is used as a means of stimulating nerve cells in the motor cortex via 
the administration of a brief magnetic pulse to the scalp. This pulse produces a 
motor evoked potential (MEP) in the specific muscle stimulated that can be 
measured via surface electromyography (EMG). As the premotor cortex extends 
posteriorly to the primary motor cortex, mirror neurons in the ventral premotor 
cortex are believed to connect sensory neurons responding to the visual properties 
of an observed action and corticospinal neurons that discharge MEPs during the 
execution of a similar action (Fadiga, Craighero & Olivier, 2005; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004; Zult, Howatson, Kádár, Farthing & Hortobágyi, 2013). Thus, 
when TMS is delivered during the observation of action within the stimulated 
muscle, it is believed that premotor mirror neuron activity increases excitability in 
the motor cortex resulting in enhanced MEP amplitude.  
It is important to note that unlike the traditional RHI, the aforementioned 
studies (Funase et al., 2007; Garry et al., 2005) utilised a MVI that facilitated the 
illusion of kinaesthetic sensation (movement) of a virtual limb as opposed to 
proprioception (position). This was achieved by placing one of the participants’ 
arms behind a mirror that was situated along their midline and instructing them to 
view this mirror image whilst moving the index finger of their opposite arm. 
Since the mirror image of the moving limb is superimposed on the participants’ 
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real hand it appears as though the hidden, static limb is also moving. TMS was 
used to measure excitability of the motor cortex with respect to the static hand 
and it was found that MEPs were significantly enhanced during the illusion when 
viewing the movement of the virtual limb compared to when the limb was at rest 
(Funase et al., 2007; Garry et al., 2005). Further, participants generally reported 
feeling the sensation that the static hand was actually moving. In accordance with 
the MNS as a possible mechanism for the experience of a foreign limb as 
belonging to the self in the RHI, as reflected in the experience of proprioceptive 
drift, the MNS could also contribute to the attribution of the movement of a 
foreign limb to the self during the MVI. Specifically, the increase in MEP 
amplitude during the movement condition likely reflects an increase in mirror 
neuron activity in the premotor cortex that resulted in the sensation of the 
movement of the virtual limb being attributed to the self. Thus providing 
empirical support for theoretical accounts concerning the role of the MNS in 
perceptual illusions and how we attribute actions to the self, compared to others. 
Given the ability to plan and initiate movement and the proprioceptive feedback 
that follows represents a hallmark of bodily self-awareness (Dummer, Picot-
Annand, Neal & Moore, 2009), the incorporation of movement in perceptual 
illusions is an invaluable tool for experimental paradigms attempting to elucidate 
the neural underpinnings of how we distinguish between the self and other. 
Despite the potential utility of this methodology to examine possible disturbances 
in these mechanisms in ASD, to date, this paradigm has yet to be employed to 
explore self-other processes in populations with an ASD. 
In light of this, the present study aimed to investigate the role of 
movement in perceptual illusions in TD individuals compared to individuals with 
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an ASD. Specifically the present study utilised TMS to measure motor cortex 
excitability during a variation of the MVI designed to elicit both the illusion of 
movement and proprioceptive drift. It was hypothesised that individuals with an 
ASD would display reduced susceptibility to the illusion compared to TD 
individuals as demonstrated by significantly lower MEP amplitude when 
observing both a static and moving hand during the MVI when compared to the 
MEP amplitude of TD individuals. Further, it was also predicted that this 
difference would extend to participants subjective experience of the illusion. 
Specifically, it was hypothesised that individuals with an ASD would report lower 
scores on the illusion items of the RHI questionnaire adapted for the present 
study, when compared to TD individuals.  
 
Method 
 
Participants. 
Participants were ten typically developing male adults (TD) and nine male 
adults with a diagnosis of either high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger’s 
syndrome (AS). One TD participant and one participant with a diagnosis of 
HFA/AS was excluded due to equipment malfunction. Participants with HFA/AS 
(M=22.8) were age stratified to TD participants (M=24.6) within 3 years (age 
range 18-34). The mean age and SD of all participants was 23.7 and 3.9 
respectively. TD participants were recruited by word of mouth and at Deakin 
University. Participants with HFA/AS were recruited from Autism Victoria’s 
research database, schools such as the Western Autistic School, word of mouth, 
and advertisements and mail outs from paediatric clinics. An experienced Clinical 
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Psychologist who has worked extensively in the autism field confirmed diagnosis 
using DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria. 
All participants were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Prior to the experimental procedures, participants completed the Adult 
Safety Screening Questionnaire to determine their suitability for transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS; Keel, Smith & Wassermann, 2001). The TMS safety 
screen was used to exclude participants who had any pre-existing medical 
conditions (such as epilepsy or stroke), or any implanted devices (such as cardiac 
pacemakers), which may have resulted in adverse effects from TMS (see 
Appendix A). 
The Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DUHREC 
2009-135) granted ethics approval in accordance with the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) prior to the commencement of this 
research (see Appendix B). All participants were provided with the plain language 
statement (PLS) and gave written, informed consent prior to engaging in the 
experimental procedures (see Appendix C). 
 
Experimental Set Up. 
 The present study used a permutation of the rubber hand illusion (RHI; 
Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) in which a mirror was used to create a situation where 
the mirrored reflection functioned as a virtual limb as opposed to the use of an 
artificial rubber limb in the traditional RHI. To achieve this, the mirror was placed 
between the subjects’ hands in such a way that the reflection of their left hand 
functioned as a virtual limb appearing to be their right hand. Importantly, their 
right hand was behind the mirror, and therefore not visible.  
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Whilst previous studies utilising this mirror-induced visual illusion (MVI) 
(e.g. Funase et al., 2007; Garry et al., 2005) have positioned the right hand such 
that the mirrored reflection is superimposed on the position of participants real 
right hand, in the present study the location of the reflected hand and the 
participants’ right hand was spatially different. Specifically, the location of the 
reflected limb and participants’ right hand were approximately 15 cm apart, see 
Figure 6.1. This variation was introduced in an attempt to facilitate proprioceptive 
drift via the incongruence of visual, tactile and proprioceptive information 
(Ehrsson et al., 2004). To establish this illusion an experimenter seated opposite 
the participant used a pair of identical soft paintbrushes to synchronously stroke 
both the visible left hand and the hidden right hand, in a proximo-distal direction 
between the second and third knuckles of the index, middle and ring fingers for 
90 seconds. Brushstrokes were delivered manually by an experimenter at a rate of 
approximately 1 Hz. This functioned as an induction phase prior to the 
administration of any TMS pulses in the experimental conditions.  
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Figure 6.1 Experimental set up of the illusion with a mirror box. The participants’ 
right hand was placed in the far right corner of the box, out of view. Their left 
hand was placed as close to the mirror as possible, in their field of view. Subjects 
focused their attention on the mirror reflection of their right hand.  
 
Experimental Design. 
There were three conditions within the experiment: baseline, illusion-
movement, and illusion-static. In all conditions electrodes were placed on the first 
dorsal interosseus (FDI) muscle of the right hand and the identified optimal 
position on the primary motor cortex (M1) to elicit motor evoked potentials 
(MEPs) in this muscle was stimulated. Before each condition the experimenter 
provided a brief explanation of what it entailed. In all conditions participants were 
seated at a table with their hands in a neutral position and the ulnar sides of their 
hands and forearms resting on the table surface directly in front of them. The 
conditions were counterbalanced between participants to account for any possible 
order effects. 
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Prior to participants engaging in the experimental conditions they 
undertook a brief training phase. This included a scripted description of the 
illusion and a demonstration, instructions as to how their hands should be placed 
with respect to the mirror, and practice completing the index finger contractions 
required for the illusion-movement condition. Following the successful 
completion of this, participants then went on to complete the experimental 
conditions. 
In the baseline condition participants were presented with a black screen 
with a white central fixation cross appearing on a 10 cm by 10 cm display 
presented on a 13-inch laptop computer screen placed approximately 60 cm away 
from the participant. During this condition 10 MEPs were taken while the 
participant focused upon the screen, whilst a wooden divider occluded 
participants’ right hand from view. The baseline condition examined individual 
participants resting MEP amplitude in the FDI muscle of their right hand.  
In the illusion-movement condition the MVI was established as described 
in the experimental set up section above. Following the 90-second induction 
phase was an experimental phase lasting approximately three minutes. During this 
phase the experimenter continued to stroke the participants’ fingers in a manner 
identical to that of the induction phase. Over the course of the three minutes the 
participant was given 10 verbal prompts to ‘move’. When instructed to move, 
participants performed a simple contraction of their left index finger and an MEP 
was taken at the apex of this contraction. The participant would relax their left 
hand following this movement until they received another verbal prompt to move. 
In order to achieve consistency, verbal prompts were timed by 10 pre-recorded 
sounds that were elicited every 15 seconds and delivered to the experimenter 
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through headphones to prevent the sound from being heard by the participant. 
During this condition an additional experimenter monitored participants right 
hand to ensure it remained completely still throughout.  
 The illusion-static condition was identical to the illusion-movement 
condition described above, except both hands remained completely still. In order 
to keep the conditions as similar as possible, participants were still given a verbal 
prompt every 15 seconds however the prompt ‘move’ was replaced with ‘don't 
move’. Similarly, MEPs were taken following each of the 10 verbal prompts.  
At the conclusion of the experimental protocol participants were given a 
version of the RHI questionnaire (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), which was adapted 
for the present study (see Appendix D), to gauge their overall subjective 
experience of the illusion. Eight of the nine questions from the original 
questionnaire were chosen, as they could be reasonably adapted to the present 
study by substituting ‘rubber hand’ for ‘reflected hand’. Each question was rated 
on a seven-point likert scale ranging from disagree strongly (-3) to agree strongly 
(3). Of the eight questions, four were statements consistent with the illusionary 
experience, items 1, 2, 5 and 7, and four were control statements not typical of the 
illusion experience, items 3, 4, 6 and 8. For the illusion statements a score above 
zero reflects an endorsement of the illusionary experience, where as a score below 
zero indicates that the illusion was not experienced. With regard to the control 
statements, a score below zero indicates that participants were able to distinguish 
between experiences typical of the illusion and those not. In contrast a score 
above zero on the control statements suggests difficulty discerning experiences 
typical of the illusion with those not.  
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Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and Electromyography. 
Surface electromyography (EMG) activity and TMS evoked motor evoked 
potentials (MEPs) were recorded from the FDI muscle of the right index finger 
using bipolar Ag-AgCl electrodes. These electrodes were also placed on the 
participants’ left hand, however no measurements were taken from these 
electrodes, rather their function was to ensure both hands looked and felt as 
similar as possible. Please refer to the transcranial magnetic stimulation and 
electromyography section in chapter four (pages 58-60) for a more detailed 
description of the methods employed. 
 
Data Analysis. 
Data was standardised (i.e. expressed as z scores) within each participant, 
attenuating the impact of highly reactive individuals on group scores and allowing 
for meaningful comparisons. Please refer to the data analysis section in chapter 
four (pages 60-61) for the equation utilised and a more detailed description of the 
statistical transformation employed. 
 
Statistical Analysis.  
 A 2x2 mixed model ANOVA (within subjects factor condition: illusion-
static and illusion-movement and between subjects factor group: TD and ASD) 
was used to compare Z score MEP amplitudes across condition and group. Where 
appropriate, planned comparisons were carried out to compare between groups 
within the same condition.  
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Results 
 
Data Screening. 
Data was cleaned, screened and analysed using SPSS Version 18 (SPSS 
Inc.) with no missing values found. Four univariate outliers were identified using 
z-scores with a criterion of α <. 001, (±3.3 cut-off). Hypothesis-related analyses 
were run with and without these outliers and as no meaningful difference was 
evident, the outliers were retained (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic indicated that both conditions were 
significantly non-normal. However an examination of the Q-Q plot for each 
condition did not suggest any significant deviations from normality. Thus, given 
the number of samples was large (n=190 MEPs per condition) it is likely that the 
significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic was due to the large number of samples 
rather than a true deviation from normality (Field, 2009). 
 
Analysis of Motor Evoked Potential Amplitudes. 
A 2x2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted in order to compare the TD 
and ASD group mean Z score MEP amplitudes across the conditions illusion-
static and illusion-movement. Box’s test of equality of covariance’s matrices was 
violated (p<.001) and Levene’s test of equality of variances was violated for the 
condition illusion-static. However, in light of these violations a more stringent 
alpha of α<.001 was adopted (cf. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The main effects 
for condition (F(1,188)=8.054, p<.01, ηp2=.04) and group (F(1,188)=4.698, p<.05, 
ηp2=.02) reached conventional levels of significance however with the adoption of 
a more stringent alpha of α<.001 both became non-significant. There was no 
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significant interaction between group and condition (F(1,188)=0.004, p>.05, 
ηp2<.01; see Figure 6.2 for plot).  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 TD and ASD mean Z scores for MEP amplitudes across the conditions 
illusion-static and illusion-movement.  
  
There was no significant interaction effect as both groups displayed 
parallel trends, however the means for both groups for both conditions differed. 
Thus to assess the significance of this difference independent samples t-test were 
undertaken to compare both groups across conditions, adjusted for unequal 
variances where necessary. Within the condition illusion-static the Z score MEP 
amplitude for the TD group was significantly higher than for the ASD group 
(t(147)=2.04, p<.05, ηp2=.03). Similarly, within the condition illusion-movement 
the Z score MEP amplitude for the TD group was significantly higher than for the 
ASD group (t(188)=2.02, p<.05, ηp2=.02; see Table 6.1 for means and Figure 6.3 
for sample MEPs). 
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Table 6.1 
Mean MEP Amplitudes and Standard Deviations Normalised to Baseline for TD 
and ASD Groups for the Conditions Illusion-Static and Illusion-Movement  
 
   Group   
 TD  ASD 
Condition Mean SD  Mean SD 
Illusion-Static 0.54 3.47  -.26 1.70 
Illusion-Movement 0.97 2.81  0.12 2.45 
 
n = 100 MEPs per condition and 10 participants in TD group 
n = 90 MEPs per condition and 9 participants in ASD group 
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Figure 6.3 Sample overlaid MEP amplitude sweeps recorded from one TD 
participant and one participant with an ASD for the conditions Illusion-Static and 
Illusion-Movement 
  115 
Analysis of Rubber Hand Illusion Questionnaire Responses. 
 Participants overall subjective experience of the illusion was 
assessed by a version of the RHI questionnaire (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), which 
was adapted for the present study (see Appendix D). Figure 6.3 depicts the mean 
scores for the four illusion items and the four control statements for both TD 
participants and participants with an ASD. As shown in Figure 6.3, on average 
TD participants reported a stronger illusionary experience than participants with 
an ASD, as evidenced by TD participant’s higher endorsement of the illusion 
items. With respect to the control statements, TD participants averaged a score 
under 0, demonstrating that they were able to distinguish between experiences 
consistent with the illusion and those not. In contrast, participants with an ASD 
averaged a score slightly above 0 with respect to the control statements, 
demonstrating that they had difficulty clearly distinguishing between experiences 
consistent with the illusion and those not.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 Mean responses for the illusion items and control statements on the 
adapted RHI for TD and ASD groups.  
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 Independent samples t-tests were conducted in order to compare the 
ratings on the illusion items and control statements within each group as well as 
between each group. These indicated that the TD groups mean ratings on the 
illusion items were significantly higher than their ratings on the control statements 
(t(78)=8.55, p<.001, ηp2=.48). This trend was similar in the ASD group as again 
the ASD groups mean ratings on the illusion items were significantly higher than 
their ratings on the control statements (t(70)=3.26, p<.01, ηp2=.13). Although the 
TD groups mean score for the illusion items was higher than the ASD groups, this 
difference just failed to reach significance (t(74)=-1.93, p>.05, ηp2=.05). However, 
the difference between the two groups ratings on the control statements was 
significantly different, with the ASD group having significantly higher ratings on 
the control statements compared to the TD group (t(74)=-2.39, p>.05, ηp2=.07; see 
Table 6.2 for means). 
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Table 6.2 
Mean Responses for the Illusion Items and Control Statements of the Adapted 
RHI Questionnaire for TD and ASD Groups  
 
   Group   
 TD  ASD 
RHI Responses Mean SD  Mean SD 
Illusion Items 2.03 1.14  1.39 1.40 
Control Statements -.95 1.89  0.06 1.77 
  
n = 4 items and 10 participants in TD group 
n = 4 items and 9 participants in ASD group 
 
Discussion 
The present study utilised an adapted mirror-induced visual illusion (MVI) 
of hand movements to investigate differences in self-other processing in 
individuals with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) compared to typically 
developing (TD) individuals. Additionally, the paradigm incorporated transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) as a means of examining the mirror neuron system 
(MNS) as a possible neural substrate mediating this process. In line with 
theoretical tenets and previous findings, it was anticipated that individuals with an 
ASD would display decreased susceptibility to both the illusion of a static and 
moving hand as belonging to the self, when compared to TD participants. The 
results supported this hypothesis, as demonstrated by mean motor evoked 
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potential (MEP) amplitudes in both the illusion-static and the illusion-movement 
conditions that were significantly lower for participants’ with an ASD compared 
to TD participants. This hypothesis was further supported by participants’ 
subjective ratings of the illusion on the illusion items of the adapted rubber hand 
illusion (RHI) questionnaire utilised for the present study. Specifically, it was 
found that individuals with an ASD rated their overall experience of the illusion 
as lower than TD individuals, however it should be noted that this difference did 
not reach significance.  
Before the implications of the above findings and the role of the MNS in 
this process can be elucidated, several additional findings need to be discussed. 
Firstly, no interaction between the groups was identified, with both groups 
demonstrating MEPs of greater magnitude in the illusion-movement condition 
compared to the illusion-static condition. However, whilst MEP amplitude was 
above baseline for both conditions in TD participants only MEPs in the illusion-
movement condition were greater than baseline for participants with an ASD. 
Given it is believed that premotor mirror neuron activity increases excitability in 
the motor cortex, resulting in enhanced MEP amplitude, it is likely that MEP 
amplitude above baseline in the illusion-static condition reflects a feeling of 
ownership over the reflected limb. This is in line with previous research 
demonstrating a relationship between the subjective rating of the illusion and the 
level of neural activity in the premotor cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2004) and 
theoretical accounts suggesting that during perceptual illusions, mirror neuron 
activity reaches threshold, subsequently giving rise to the perception of feeling a 
foreign limb as belonging to the self (Ramachandran & Brang, 2009). Thus, MEP 
amplitude above baseline in the illusion-static condition in TD participants is 
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indicative of a feeling of ownership of the foreign limb. On the contrary, the MEP 
amplitude below baseline observed in participants with an ASD, is suggestive of 
an absent or weaker illusionary experience, likely a consequence of reduced 
mirror neuron activation.  
For both groups, MEP amplitude in the illusion-movement condition was 
above baseline and also above the MEP amplitude of the illusion-static condition. 
In agreement with previous research, this indicates that not only did an increase in 
mirror neuron activity give rise to the perception of feeling a static foreign limb as 
belonging to the self in TD participants; the movement of a foreign limb was also 
attributed to the self (Funase et al., 2007; Garry et al., 2005). It should be noted 
that some studies suggest that simply performing certain hand movements can 
increase excitability in both the contralateral motor cortex controlling the 
movement and the ipsilateral motor cortex controlling the hand at rest (Garry et 
al., 2005; Liepert, Dettmers, Terborg, & Weiller, 2001). Consequently, the 
specific contribution of the MNS to the attribution of the movement of a foreign 
limb to the self in the present study is difficult to distinguish from inter 
hemispheric processes during unilateral movements.  
Ideally the present study would have also included a condition where 
participants simply performed the index finger movement and observed it whilst 
the motor cortex of their resting hand was stimulated. However this was omitted 
to minimise the burden on participants in this complex paradigm. Despite the 
possible constraints this poses, the literature suggests that low force movements, 
such as the index finger contractions performed in the present study, do not 
increase excitability bilaterally in the motor cortices, thus the possible impact of 
this is likely attenuated (Liepert et al., 2001). Further, it should be highlighted that 
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when compared to TD individuals, individuals with an ASD do not show 
differential bilateral motor cortex activation when simply performing and 
observing their own hand movements (Théoret et al., 2005). Thus, the significant 
group difference in MEP amplitude in the illusion-movement condition likely 
reflects a true difference in the attribution of a movement to the self during the 
illusion, rather than simply an artefact of bilateral activation when performing a 
unilateral finger movement.  
The present finding that individuals with an ASD display reduced 
susceptibility to both the illusion of proprioceptive drift and the illusion of 
kinaesthetic experience is further supported by participants’ subjective reports. It 
was found that, whilst ASD participants did endorse illusionary items on the 
adapted RHI questionnaire, on average they reported a weaker illusionary 
experience when compared to TD individuals. It is also interesting to note that 
individuals with an ASD endorsed the control statements, not typical of the 
illusion experience, on the adapted RHI questionnaire whereas TD participants 
did not. This suggests that whilst participants with an ASD did experience the 
illusion, not only was it to a weaker degree than TD participants but they were 
also less able to discern experiences typical of the illusion with those not.  
Given the ability to plan and initiate movement and the proprioceptive 
feedback that follows, represents a hallmark of bodily self-awareness (Dummer, 
Picot-Annand, Neal & Moore, 2009), ultimately the findings of the present study 
support previous theory and research suggesting that self-other processing is at 
least in part, sub-served by the MNS (Enticott et al., 2008; Uddin et al., 2007). 
Further strengthening the argument that the MNS is important in self-other 
processing, is the present studies finding that participants with an ASD displayed 
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a mirror-related deficit in self-awareness (Hadjikhani et al., 2006; Théoret et al., 
2005). This deficit in self-awareness was reflected in both ASD participants 
weaker cortical activation, indicative of reduced MNS activation, during a 
perceptual illusion of kinaesthetic experience, and their difficulty discerning their 
experience in subjective measures. The deficits in self-awareness in individuals 
with an ASD indicated in the present study could not only have significant 
implications for self-other processing, it could also contribute to many of the 
disturbances in socio-communicative abilities that form the hallmark of ASD. 
Given self-awareness is fundamental to our ability to identify, differentiate and 
compare the self and other, a disturbance at this level could subsequently give rise 
to difficulties understanding others as intentional agents. Consequently, this could 
contribute to the observable difficulties individuals with an ASD have making 
inferences regarding others emotions, thoughts and intentions (Cascio, Foss-Feig, 
Burnette, Heacock & Cosby, 2012). As these skills are in turn believed to be 
foundational for the development of social relational skills such as imitation and 
empathy, (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti 2004) it is clear that a disturbance at the 
basic level of self-awareness could contribute to the higher order social and 
communicative deficits observed in ASD.  
When interpreting the findings of the present study, a number of 
limitations should be considered. As the sample size was modest, replication in 
larger samples is needed to more firmly establish the present findings. Further as 
the present sample only included male adults the results are therefore limited in 
their generalizability. Another limitation of the present study was that a measure 
of empathic abilities was not utilised. Given research suggests that higher 
empathic abilities are associated with greater susceptibility to perceptual illusions 
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(Cascio et al., 2012; Asai, Mao, Sugimori & Tanno, 2011) the incorporation of an 
index of empathy would have allowed for a better understanding of the link 
between disturbances in self-awareness and the impact this has on social 
relational skills. Thus, future research should include an index of empathic 
abilities in order to explore this further. Due to the design of the present study an 
additional limitation is that no inferences with regard to temporal dynamics can 
be made. Previous research suggests that children with ASD display a delayed 
onset of the illusion relative to TD children (Cascio et al., 2012). This raises the 
question of how the neural mechanisms change over the duration of the illusion in 
TD individuals compared to individuals with an ASD. Therefore, future studies 
are needed to examine changes in the neural mechanisms over time in order to 
provide a more detailed understanding of the differences in the underlying 
processes for TD individuals compared to individuals with an ASD during 
perceptual illusions.  
In conclusion, the present study supports the notion that self-other 
processing is, at least in part, sub-served by the MNS. Further the present study 
also suggests that individuals with ASD possess a mirror-related deficit in self-
awareness that affects self-other processing. This supports the putative link 
between abnormalities of the MNS in individuals with an ASD and observed 
impairments in social and communicative functioning such as deficits in social 
relational skills. Although further research is required to elucidate the link 
between self-other processing, the MNS and ASD, the present study raises several 
questions regarding the possible downstream consequences that may result from 
basic disturbances in self-awareness and the role the MNS may play in this. 
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Chapter 7: General Discussion  
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Introduction 
Elucidating the neural basis of the social and communicative deficits that 
characterise autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has proved challenging. However, 
the recent discovery of visuomotor cells, known as mirror neurons, in macaque 
monkeys may provide a basis for explaining various behavioural impairments 
exhibited by individuals with ASD (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). While mirror 
neurons are primarily thought to be involved in the perception and comprehension 
of motor acts, they are also believed to play a fundamental role in higher order 
cognitive processes such as empathy, imitation, self-other processing and theory 
of mind (ToM), all of which are known to be impaired in ASD (Fecteau, Lepage 
& Théoret, 2006; Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf & Perrett, 2001). 
In light of this, the present dissertation aimed to investigate and compare 
mirror neuron activity in high functioning individuals with an ASD and typically 
developing (TD) individuals using three distinct experimental paradigms. This 
was achieved by utilising transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to infer mirror 
neuron activation during tasks requiring emotional and social processing. TMS 
was used, as it is a means of stimulating nerve cells in the motor cortex via the 
administration of a brief magnetic pulse to the scalp. This pulse produces a motor 
evoked potential (MEP) in the specific muscle stimulated that can be measured 
via surface electromyography (EMG). As the premotor cortex extends posteriorly 
to the primary motor cortex, mirror neurons in the ventral premotor cortex are 
believed to connect sensory neurons responding to the visual properties of an 
observed action and corticospinal that discharge motor evoked potentials during 
the execution of a similar action (Fadiga, Craighero & Olivier, 2005; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004; Zult, Howatson, Kádár, Farthing & Hortobágyi, 2013). Thus, 
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when TMS is delivered during the observation of action within the stimulated 
muscle, it is believed that increased synaptic input from premotor mirror neurons 
onto corticospinal neurons, increases excitability in the motor cortex, resulting in 
enhanced MEP amplitude (Enticott, Johnston, Herring, Hoy & Fitzgerald., 2008; 
Zult et al., 2013). Collectively, the results of this thesis suggest that mirror neuron 
system (MNS) activation differs between TD individuals and individuals with an 
ASD during tasks requiring emotional and social processing.  
Specifically, the results suggest that when presented with stimuli of a 
socio-emotional nature, TD individuals display greater MNS activation compared 
to control conditions. This was reflected in TD individuals’ increased MEP 
amplitude. Further, the results also suggest that individuals with an ASD display 
marked disturbances in MNS activity during tasks requiring emotional and social 
processing. These disturbances being that individuals with an ASD displayed a 
response that was either inhibited, absent or reduced compared to TD individuals. 
This suggests that in individuals with an ASD, the synaptic efficacy between 
premotor mirror neurons and corticospinal neurons may be reduced, resulting in a 
response that is markedly lower than that of TD individuals. Thus, this chapter 
will outline how the major findings of each study contribute to the notion that 
social cognition is, at least partially, sub-served by the MNS, and that 
disturbances in this system likely contribute to the social communicative 
disturbances observed in ASD.  
 
Social Cognition and the Mirror Neuron System  
Collectively, the results of the present thesis support the putative link 
between the MNS and various aspects of social cognition. Firstly, given the well-
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entrenched conceptual connection between mimicry and social cognition in 
psychological thought (McIntosh, 2006; Rogers, Hepburn, Stackhouse & Wehner, 
2003), study one investigated automatic mimicry of emotional facial expressions. 
In line with theoretical tenets and previous findings (McIntosh et al., 2006; 
Oberman, 2009), study one found that TD individuals automatically mimic 
emotional facial expressions, as demonstrated by the significantly larger MEPs 
when viewing emotional compared to neutral facial expressions (McIntosh et al., 
2006; Oberman, 2009). In this context, it can be inferred that during facial 
emotion processing, mirror neurons in the premotor cortex provide an internal 
simulation of the observed motoric behaviour that evokes a similar reaction in the 
corresponding muscles of the observer. It is believed that this simulation process 
allows TD individuals to understand the observed individual’s mental and 
affective state (Enticott et al., 2008), in turn facilitating social functioning and 
communication (Uddin et al., 2007). 
To further explore the role of the MNS in social cognition, study two 
examined yawning contagion, as it is believed that contagiousness of yawning 
depends on mechanisms that develop during childhood in parallel with the 
empathic capacity to understand mental states of others. Study two’s finding that 
TD participants displayed the capacity for yawning contagion, as demonstrated by 
significantly larger MEPs when viewing yawns compared to control mouth 
movements, supported this view. In a similar vein to when viewing an emotional 
facial expression, the results of study two suggest that when viewing another 
yawn, mirror neurons in the premotor cortex provide an internal simulation of the 
observed motoric behaviour, evoking a similar reaction in the corresponding 
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muscles of the observer. Thus, it is believed that this system may underlie the 
contagious aspects of the phenomenon. 
Lastly, as the ability to identify, differentiate and compare the self and 
other is believed to play a fundamental role in social cognition, study three 
investigated this process. Specifically, study three utilised an adapted mirror-
induced visual illusion (MVI) of hand movements to investigate the role of the 
MNS in self-other processing. The illusion attempted to elicit both the feeling of 
ownership over a foreign limb, as well as the attribution of the movement of a 
foreign limb to the self. The results of study three suggest that this was achieved 
in TD participants as not only did their subjective reports indicate that they 
experienced the illusion; MEPs in the illusion conditions were greater than 
baseline levels. As it is believed that premotor mirror neuron activity increases 
excitability in the motor cortex, resulting in enhanced MEP amplitudes, it is likely 
that MEP amplitude above baseline during the illusion reflects a feeling of 
ownership over the reflected limb. Thus, given the ability to plan and initiate 
movement and the proprioceptive feedback that follows, represents a hallmark of 
bodily self-awareness (Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal & Moore, 2009), ultimately 
the findings of the present study support previous theory and research suggesting 
that self-other processing is at least in part, sub-served by the MNS (Enticott et 
al., 2008; Uddin et al., 2007). 
Together, the findings of the three studies support the putative link 
between the MNS and various aspects of social cognition. Specifically, the results 
support the notion that mirror neurons might form a critical link in the chain from 
behaviour observation to understanding others mental and emotional states, 
whereby automatic processing by mirror neurons allows an internal modelling of 
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another’s motoric behaviour that evokes a similar reaction in the observer. In turn 
facilitating an understanding of the observed individual’s mental and affective 
state. Thus, via the MNS, physiological and associated emotional states of two 
individuals can be shared based on perceived motor patterns (Enticott et al., 2008; 
Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange & Keenan, 2007). This purported motor empathy or 
empathic resonance is one component within a multi-component model of human 
empathy that is adjacent to and underlies the development of higher order 
cognitive processes such as cognitive and emotional empathy and ToM abilities 
(Williams et al., 2001). The finding that the MNS and the limbic system are 
anatomically connected via the insula in the primate brain (Augustine, 1996), 
further adds weight to this idea. From experiments using primates and fMRI 
studies in humans, it is believed that in the human brain, a large-scale network in 
which the insula acts as an interface between the frontal components of the MNS 
and the limbic system, enables the translation of an observed or imitated motoric 
action, such as a facial expression, into its internally felt emotional significance 
(Carr et al., 2003; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
To surmise, in line with theoretical tenets and previous findings, the 
collective results of this thesis suggest that during tasks requiring socio-emotional 
processing, TD individuals display an increased motoric response compared to 
baseline conditions, which is likely reflective of increased premotor mirror neuron 
activity (Enticott et al., 2008). This provides further evidence for the perceived 
importance of the MNS in social cognition.   
As a result of the association between the theorised function of the MNS 
outlined above and the behavioural deficits seen in ASD, it has also been 
hypothesised that the MNS may be impaired in individuals with an ASD. 
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Accordingly, in addition to the empirical evidence supporting the link between 
the MNS and social cognition in TD individuals (e.g. Agnew, Bhakoo & Puri, 
2007; Oberman, Pineda, & Ramachandran, 2007; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), 
there is also evidence suggesting a deficit in this system may be linked to the 
social-emotional deficits observed in ASD (e.g. Buccino & Amore, 2008; 
Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder & Tager-Flusberg, 2006). The results of the present 
thesis provides further support for this argument as it was found that participants 
with an ASD displayed marked disturbances in MNS activity during tasks 
requiring emotional and social processing. Given this, with respect to the present 
findings, the following section will discuss the role of the MNS in disturbances of 
various aspects of social cognition in ASD and the implications of these. 
 
The Role of the Mirror Neuron System in Disturbances of Social Cognition 
in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
In line with previous research, study one found that when presented with 
emotional facial expressions participants with an ASD did not display the 
tendency to automatically mimic the expression with which they were presented 
(McIntosh et al., 2006; Stel, van den Heuvel & Smeets, 2008). In addition, 
participants with an ASD exhibited significantly lower MEP amplitudes when 
viewing emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. This suggests that when 
presented with stimuli that are emotional in nature, an automatic mimicry 
response is actively inhibited in individuals with an ASD, supporting the notion 
that individuals with an ASD likely possess a disturbance in the MNS. 
Specifically, the present results support the inference that when individuals with 
an ASD view emotional facial expressions, reduced synaptic efficacy between 
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premotor mirror neurons and corticospinal neurons suppresses activity in the 
facial region of the primary motor cortex (M1), in turn resulting in an inhibited 
response at the muscular level as evidenced by reduced MEP amplitude. This is 
further supported by fMRI research demonstrating that when observing emotional 
facial expressions, children and adults with an ASD display reduced activation in 
the premotor mirror neuron area compared to TD participants (Dapretto et al., 
2006).  
In a similar vein to study one, study two found that when viewing others 
yawns, individuals with an ASD displayed a disturbance in the ability to yawn 
contagiously. Specifically, the findings of study two support the inference that 
when individuals with an ASD view the yawn of another, reduced synaptic 
efficacy between premotor mirror neurons and corticospinal neurons, fail to 
activate the corresponding facial region of the M1 cortex, in turn failing to elicit a 
corresponding response at the muscular level as evidenced by similar MEP 
amplitude when viewing both yawns and control mouth movements. Although the 
present thesis examined adults with a diagnosis of ASD, it is important to 
highlight the possible developmental consequences of the imitative and emotional 
contagion deficits identified in study one and two.  
In development, imitative and emotional contagion abilities are believed 
to provide the child with information about the actions and intentions of those 
around them, which assists the process of social learning and forms the basis for 
future social development (Rogers, Hepburn, Stackhouse & Wehner, 2003). 
Given this, a deficit in these abilities could not only impair a child’s ability to 
understand the emotions of others but, if such a deficit occurred early in 
development it could significantly impair the child’s ability to form self-other 
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representations (Rodgers, 1999). In light of this, study three explored self-other 
processing in individuals with an ASD. Study three showed that individuals with 
an ASD displayed a deficit in self-awareness, reflected in both ASD participants 
weaker cortical activation, indicative of reduced MNS activation, during a 
perceptual illusion of kinaesthetic experience, and their difficulty discerning their 
experience in subjective measures. Given self-awareness is fundamental to our 
ability to identify, differentiate and compare the self and other, a disturbance at 
this level could subsequently give rise to difficulties understanding others as 
intentional agents. Consequently this could contribute to the observable 
difficulties individuals with an ASD have making inferences regarding others 
emotions, thoughts and intentions (Cascio, Foss-Feig, Burnette, Heacock & 
Cosby, 2012).  
In summary, the results of this thesis show that during tasks requiring 
socio-emotional processing, individuals with an ASD demonstrate disturbed 
motoric responses, likely reflective of reduced synaptic efficacy between 
premotor mirror neurons and corticospinal neurons, and deficits in aspects of 
social cognition such as automatic mimicry, emotion contagion and self-
awareness. As these skills are believed to be foundational for the development of 
social relational skills such as imitation and empathy, (Gallese, Keysers, & 
Rizzolatti 2004) it is clear that a disturbance with in these aspects of social 
cognition could contribute to the higher order social and communicative deficits 
observed in ASD. Thus, together, the results provide support for both the notion 
that social cognition may, at least in part, be sub served by the MNS and that 
disturbances in this system likely contribute to the social communicative 
disturbances observed in ASD. 
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Future Directions 
The present findings raise important questions regarding the possible 
downstream consequences of deficits in aspects of social cognition that are 
believed to be foundational for effective social and communicative skills. For 
example, it has been established that TD new born babies exhibit rudimentary 
forms of facial mimicry (Meltzoff & Moore, 1989). Further, in a normal 
developmental trajectory, these behaviours increase in complexity and form the 
basis for future social development by providing the individual with information 
about the actions and intentions of others (Rogers et al., 2003) Thus, if a mimicry 
deficit occurred early in the developmental trajectory of a child with an ASD not 
only would automatic mimicry behaviour be significantly impaired, this could 
consequently impair the child’s ability to co-experience other beings emotional 
states (McIntosh et al., 2006). This deficit in emotional contagion may 
subsequently prevent the child with an ASD from developing a sense of inter 
subjectivity and emotional correspondence which are crucial for social learning 
and the understanding of other minds (Bandura, 1977; Meltzoff, 1999). As a 
consequence, this in turn could impair the development of higher order socio-
communicative abilities such as empathy, emotional reciprocity and ToM, 
disturbances of which characterise ASD (APA, 2013).  
However as the present thesis and most previous research has examined 
only adult or adolescent populations in a cross-sectional design, any 
developmental inferences theorised or drawn are done so speculatively. Thus, 
given the developmental significance of social cognition, future research needs to 
investigate these abilities in child and adolescent TD and ASD populations over 
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time in order to establish the developmental trajectory of these behaviours with 
respect to the MNS. In addition to the question of developmental trajectory of 
social cognition and the role of the MNS in this, is the question of whether the 
proposed mirror mechanism is innate or acquired through experience. Whilst it is 
known that the MNS is extremely plastic and specific motor experience can 
modify its experience (Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008), the extent of mirror 
neuron activity at birth and in the first few months of life, still remains unknown. 
Therefore, future research should develop experimental paradigms to investigate 
these mechanisms from birth in order to determine whether this process is learned 
or innate.  
 It is important to note that in both the present thesis and the extant 
literature, the issue of causation remains unresolved, with MNS dysfunction being 
either a cause or a consequence of the social and communicative disturbances that 
form the hallmark of ASD. However this is not unique to research examining the 
MNS in ASD. Instead this is common to most areas examining cortical activity as 
the correlational nature of neuroimaging and neuropsychological data ensures that 
caution must be taken when attempting to infer causality.  
It should also be emphasised that at no point does the present thesis 
attempt to posit that a deficit in the MNS is solely responsible for the social and 
communicative deficits observed in ASD. As studies have demonstrated that the 
MNS interacts with other brain regions during tasks involving emotional 
processing in TD individuals (e.g Carr et al., 2003; Iacoboni, 2005) it is instead 
posited that the MNS is part of a large-scale neural network involved in social and 
emotional information processing. Thus, given several studies suggest that 
functional connectivity is disturbed in ASD (e.g. Rudie et al., 2012; Wass, 2011) 
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it is essential that connectivity between regions believed to possess mirror 
neurons, and other regions implicated in emotional processing are explored 
further in ASD samples. This could help explain the heterogeneity seen in ASD, 
as specific problems in connectivity between the mirror neuron network and 
additional brain regions could result in a multitude of variable symptoms. 
Determining the neurological source of an impairment within the MNS could help 
decide whether it should be pursued in relation to developing new ways of 
diagnosing and treating ASD, or whether it should simply be considered a 
consequence of impaired social relating  
Whist this section highlighted various gaps in the extant literature with 
respect to the possible role of the MNS in the social and communicative 
disturbances observed in ASD, when interpreting the findings of the present 
dissertation, a number of limitations should be considered before the concluding 
remarks are drawn. 
 
Limitations  
A potential important limitation of the present thesis is that no formal IQ 
measures were completed. Intelligent quotient measures are commonly assessed, 
then covaried out to determine if group differences between TD individuals and 
individuals with an ASD are independent of underlying differences in 
intelligence. Thus, the lack of formal IQ testing in the present thesis means that 
the possible influence of intelligence upon the results could not be ruled out. 
However, as the present study utilised individuals with a confirmed diagnosis of 
high functioning autism or Asperger’s disorder, limiting the range in which IQ 
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could vary between groups to 70 or above, the potential influence of this was 
perceived to be minimal.  
 Another limitation of the present thesis was that no formal measures of 
autistic symptom severity were utilised. Given that research suggests that greater 
symptom severity in ASD is associated with more significant impairments in 
social cognition (Dapretto et al., 2006) the inclusion of a measure assessing this 
could have provided additional insights. A further limitation of the present thesis 
was that a measure of empathic abilities was not utilised. Given research suggests 
that the aspects of social cognition examined in the present dissertation are linked 
to empathic abilities (Cascio et al., 2012; Platek et al., 2003; Sonnby-Borgström, 
2002) the incorporation of an index of empathy would have allowed for a better 
understanding of the link between disturbances in social cognition and the impact 
this has on social relational skills. Thus future research should include an index of 
empathic abilities in order to explore this further. 
 
Conclusion 
Given its intuitive appeal, the mirror neuron hypothesis of ASD has been 
tested frequently in recent years, using various techniques and approaches. The 
present thesis sought to further this line of inquiry by utilising TMS to investigate 
and compare mirror neuron activity in individuals with an ASD and TD 
individuals during tasks requiring emotional and social processing. Collectively, 
the results of the present thesis suggest that MNS activation increases when TD 
individuals are presented with stimuli of a socio-emotional nature. By 
comparison, individuals with an ASD displayed marked disturbances in MNS 
  136 
activity during tasks requiring emotional and social processing, exhibiting a 
response that was either inhibited, reduced or absent. 
Thus the present thesis supports the notion that social cognition may, at 
least in part, be sub-served by the MNS and that disturbances in this system likely 
contribute to the social communicative disturbances observed in ASD. Although 
much research is required to elucidate the link between social cognition, the MNS 
and ASD, the present dissertation raises several questions regarding the possible 
downstream consequences that may result from imitative deficits and abnormal 
self-other representations early in development, which appear to be linked to 
disturbances in the MNS. As such, the present thesis contributes new knowledge 
on the processes that shape social cognition in both the typical and atypical social 
mind as well as highlighting possible neural substrates that mediate this process. 
It is crucial that research continues to explore mirror neuron activity in TD 
individuals as well as individuals with an ASD, as explicating the role of mirror 
neuron dysfunction in ASDs will not only improve diagnostic clarity but it will 
also have substantial treatment implications as the brain is a plastic organ and its 
function and structure can be modified by training. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Safety screen 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation† (TMS) Adult Safety Screen 
 
Name: 
Date: 
Age: 
 
Please answer the following: 
 
Have you ever:  
 
Had an adverse reaction to TMS?      Yes     No 
Had a seizure?        Yes     No 
Had an electroencephalogram (EEG)?     Yes     No 
Had a stroke?        Yes     No 
Had a serious head injury (include neurosurgery)?    Yes     No 
Had any other brain-related condition?     Yes     No 
Had any illness that caused brain injury?    Yes     No 
 
Do you have any metal in your head (outside the mouth)  
such as shrapnel, surgical clips, or fragments from welding  
or metalwork?       Yes     No 
Do you have any implanted devices such  
as cardiac pacemakers, medical pumps, or intracardiac lines?  Yes     No 
Do you suffer from frequent or severe headaches?   Yes     No 
Are you taking any medications?      Yes     No 
Are you pregnant, or is it possible that you may be pregnant? Yes     No 
Does anyone in your family have epilepsy?     Yes     No 
Do you need further explanation of TMS and its associated risks?  Yes     No 
 
If you answered yes to any of the above, please provide details (use reverse if 
necessary): 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
† For use with single-pulse TMS, paired-pulse TMS, or repetitive TMS. 
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SUBJECT INFORMATION 
 
 
Subject Details 
Subject Name: _____________________________________________________ 
Address: __________________________________________________________ 
Ph:  Sex:  
DOB:  Occupation: ___________________ 
Ethnic Background:   
Background information 
Do you suffer from any known neurological disorders? 
  
Are you currently taking any medication which influences nerve conduction or 
blood clotting? If so, what? 
  
Do you regularly drink beverages containing caffeine?  If so, how many cups per 
day? 
  
Which hand do you use for most daily activities when using only one? 
  
Are you involved in regular physical activity requiring the use of your 
hands/arms?  If so, what is the activity/activities, the intensity and time 
commitment? 
Activity: __________________________________________________________ 
Intensity: _________________________________________________ 
Hours per week: ____________________________________________________ 
Months per year: ___________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C: Plain Language Statement and Consent Form 
 
 
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:  Participants 
 
 
Plain Language Statement  
Date: April 21 2011  
Full Project Title: Mirror neuron deficit and reduced neural connectivity in high functioning 
autism  
Principal Researcher: Associate Professor Mark Stokes 
Student Researchers: Tom Perkins and Kayleigh Young 
 
 
This Plain Language Statement and Consent Form is 6 pages long. Please make sure 
you have all the pages.  
1. Your Consent 
You are invited to take part in this research project.   
This Plain Language Statement contains detailed information about the research project. 
Its purpose is to explain to you as openly and clearly as possible all the procedures 
involved in this project so that you can make a fully informed decision whether you are 
going to participate.  
Please read this Plain Language Statement carefully. Feel free to ask questions about 
any information in the document.  You may also wish to discuss the project with a relative 
or friend or your local health worker. Feel free to do this. 
Once you understand what the project is about and if you agree to take part in it, you will 
be asked to sign the Consent Form. By signing the Consent Form, you indicate that you 
understand the information and that you give your consent to participate in the research 
project. 
You will be given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep as 
a record. 
2. Purpose and Background 
The purpose of this project is to investigate an aspect of the brain that is believed to 
function differently in high functioning autism compared to non-autistic persons. This will 
use Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS).  
 
In this study, we will ask you to participate in two trials. In the first trial, we will brush your 
hand lightly with a brush in order to elicit an illusion. In the second trial, we will ask you to 
  170 
observe a series of different facial expressions. During these two trials, you will be 
exposed to a TMS pulse.  TMS is a non-invasive, painless and safe technique that has 
been in use world-wide in clinical, and laboratory settings, for more than 25 years, and is 
used routinely to investigate the human nervous system with very low risk. The TMS 
utilises a coil which is held over the subjects scalp, and employs a magnetic field to 
activate the brain. A brief pulse of a magnetic field activates the brain tissue beneath the 
coil. From your perspective, all you would notice is possibly a very light tap or touch on 
the head (not all participants report this) and an audible click sound.  
 
This research is being conducted as part of a PhD (Psychology) thesis.  
A total of at least 24 people will participate in this project. 
These tasks will be undertaken to explore two prominent theories relating to brain 
differences between those with HFA and controls (mirror neuron hypothesis and cortical 
under-connectivity).  
You are invited to participate in this research project because you are 16 years of age or 
above, and/or have a diagnosis of HFA.  
 
The results of this research may be used to help researcher Tom Perkins to obtain a 
Doctorate of Philosophy. 
The results of this research may be used to help researcher - Kayleigh Young to obtain 
a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
3. Procedures 
The study will be conducted at the Burwood campus of Deakin University and will take 
approximately an hour and a half. You will come into the lab, and meet the research 
team. We will tell you a bit about TMS and answer any questions you may have. You will 
then fill out a short questionnaire measuring traits associated with autism. Following this, 
we will begin setting up for the TMS. We ask that you do not wear hair product, and are 
clean shaven for this research. The reason for this is that hair on the skin can interrupt 
the signal of the TMS. During the set-up for the TMS, we will measure your head with 
measuring tape, and place the electrodes on your hand/face. As part of this set-up, an 
experimenter will take a number of TMS pulses in order to identify the minimum strength 
of the TMS required to get a response from your brain. Following this, we will begin the 
experimental trials.    
 
In trial one of the study, you will take part in an illusion. For this illusion, you will be 
seated at a table with your right arm in a wooden box. The positioning of this box will 
mean you cannot see your right arm. You will place your left arm on the table so that you 
can see it. The left wall of the box has a mirror, so that you will be able to see the 
reflection of your left arm in this mirror. An experimenter will be seated on the other side 
of the table in front of you. This experimenter will use two acrylic paint-brushes to gently 
stroke your right hand (which you cannot see) and your left hand (which you can see). In 
some subjects, this creates an illusion where you experience the touch of the brush on 
your right hand as occurring in the reflection of the mirror, rather than your actual right 
hand. During this trial, we will ask you to make small index finger movements with your 
left hand. While you are completing this, a second experimenter will stimulate you with a 
TMS pulse to see how your brain activates during this illusion. We will also take TMS 
pulse measures while you watch another experimenter move their hand, whilst you move 
your own hand, and whilst you keep your hand still. Following the experiment, we will ask 
you to fill out a very short questionnaire which asks whether you experienced the illusion 
or not.       
 
 
In trial two of the study, stimulation of parts in the brain involved in different facial 
expressions will be assessed by recording responses produced in facial muscles.  These 
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responses are recorded with electromyography (EMG) pads. These pads are taped to 
the skin, and measure the level of activity in the brain that is associated with that muscle. 
During this experiment, you will simply be asked to observe a short video of people with 
an angry expression, people with a happy expression, people with a neutral expression, 
then people yawning.    
4. Possible Benefits 
Benefits include potentially identifying brain regions which are associated with autistic 
symptoms. Moreover this research provides an opportunity to integrate two prominent 
theories of autism related to brain pathology. It is hoped this research will benefit 
diagnostic clarity to autism. We cannot guarantee or promise that you will receive any 
direct benefits from this project.  
5. Possible Risks 
A potential risk may be that you will experience a slight headache following the TMS 
stimulation. TMS has been in use world-wide in clinical, and laboratory settings, for more 
than 25 years, and is used routinely to investigate the human nervous system with very 
low risk. TMS is a safe technique, and does not lead to any long lasting effects. In very 
rare circumstances, seizures have been reported using TMS. Prior to any TMS, you will 
undertake a safety screen to ensure you are appropriate for this technique. If you have a 
history of seizures, this research will not be appropriate for you to participate in.  
 
Another issue to note is the possibility of a non-autistic participant receiving a high score 
on the autistic trait questionnaire. It is important to recognise that a high score on this 
questionnaire does not mean you are autistic. The questionnaire measures trait’s 
associated with the disorder, but does not mean you are autistic.  
6. Privacy, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Information 
The data in this study you provide will be identifiable such that your responses to 
the questionnaire can be matched to your TMS responses.  However, you will not 
be identifiable by name, as we will use subject numbers to connect the information 
together.  A separate list will contain information holding your subject number and 
your name; enabling us to remove your data from the study should you wish it.  
Thereafter, only aggregated data will be reported in a thesis.  
The information collected during the study will be stored in hard-copy and 
computer files in secure storage for a minimum of 6 years, in accordance with 
Deakin University guidelines. Following this period the hard copy files will be 
destroyed and the computer files deleted. A report of the study may be submitted for 
publication to a psychological journal, however individual participants will not be 
identifiable in such a report as only aggregate data will be reported 
7. Results of Project 
You are encouraged to contact the researcher at the completion of the study to be 
informed of the aggregate research findings. Aggregate results will be published in a 
thesis and it is anticipated that they will also form part of a publication in a psychology 
journal.   
8. Participation is Voluntary 
Participation in any research project is voluntary. If you do not wish to take part you 
are not obliged to. If you decide to take part and later change your mind, you are free to 
withdraw from the project at any. Any information obtained from you to date will not be 
used and will be destroyed.  
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Your decision whether to take part or not to take part, or to take part and then withdraw, 
will not affect your relationship with Deakin University or through which you have been 
invited to participate.  
Before you make your decision, a member of the research team will be available to 
answer any questions you have about the research project. You can ask for any 
information you want.  Sign the Consent Form only after you have had a chance to ask 
your questions and have received satisfactory answers. 
If you decide to withdraw from this project, please do not submit your questionnaire. 
9. Ethical Guidelines 
This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Human Research (2007) produced by the National Health and Medical Research Council 
of Australia. This statement has been developed to protect the interests of people who 
agree to participate in human research studies. 
The ethics aspects of this research project have been approved by the Human Research 
Ethics Committee of Deakin University. 
10.         Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the research, the way it is being 
conducted or any questions about your rights as a participant, then you may contact The 
Manager, Office of Research Integrity, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, 
Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, Facsimile: 9244 6581, research-
ethics@deakin.edu.au. 
 
Please quote project number EC 135 -2009. 
11.  Reimbursement for your costs 
You will paid $10 to reimburse costs incurred.   
12. Further Information, Queries or Any Problems 
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you have any 
problems concerning this project (for example, any side effects), you can contact the 
principal researcher, Associate Professor Mark Stokes, or the student researchers Tom 
Perkins and Kayleigh Young.  
The researchers responsible for this project are: 
Tom Perkins (student researcher), Deakin University, Faculty of Health, Medicine, 
Nursing, and Behavioural Sciences, School of Psychology, 221 Burwood Hwy, 
Burwood, 3125, Ph: 9251 7235. For after hours contact, please call 0400 128 098.  
 
Kayleigh Young (student researcher), Deakin University, Faculty of Health, Medicine, 
Nursing, and Behavioural Sciences, School of Psychology, 221 Burwood Hwy, Burwood, 
3125, Ph:0433337847. 
 
Associate Professor Mark Stokes (principal researcher), Deakin University, Faculty 
of Health, Medicine, Nursing, and Behavioural Sciences, School of Psychology, 
221 Burwood Hwy, Burwood, 3125, Ph: 9244 6865.  
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DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:  Participants 
 
Consent Form 
Date:  
Full Project Title: Mirror neuron deficit and reduced neural connectivity in high functioning 
autism  
 
I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain 
Language Statement.  
I have been given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep.  
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including 
where information about this project is published, or presented in any public form.   
Participant’s Name (printed)  
Signature  Date   
 
Tom Perkins 
School of Psychology, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural 
Sciences 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood 
3125, Victoria. 
 
Kayleigh Young 
School of Psychology, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural 
Sciences 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood 
3125, Victoria. 
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DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:  Participants 
 
 
Revocation of Consent Form 
(To be used for participants who wish to withdraw from the project) 
Date:  
Full Project Title: Mirror neuron deficit and reduced neural connectivity in high functioning 
autism  
 
 
 
I hereby wish to WITHDRAW my consent to participate in the above research project and 
understand that such withdrawal WILL NOT jeopardise my relationship with Deakin 
University  
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) . 
 
 
Signature Date  
 
 
 
Please mail this form to: 
 
 
Tom Perkins 
School of Psychology, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural 
Sciences 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood 
3125, Victoria. 
 
Kayleigh Young 
School of Psychology, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural 
Sciences 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood 
3125, Victoria. 
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Appendix D: Adapted Rubber Hand Illusion Questionnaire
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